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Tenure Rights In Contractual And
Constitutional Context
RONALD C. BROWN*
Introduction
Tenure as a working concept in academic employment has come to exist for
numerous reasons including the desire to protect the academic freedom of the
faculty and the need to provide job security in order to draw and retain good
people. 1 The basic goal of tenure is to insure that faculty members will not be
dismissed without adequate cause and without due process. 2 Studies indicate
that in 1972 approximately 94 percent of all faculty members in American
universities and colleges served at institutions recognizing tenure in some
form. 3
Until the early 1970's the courts had been largely uninvolved in resolving
disputes about the legal aspects of academic tenure. Since that time however,
a relative explosion of litigation has occurred in higher education and in
appreciable measure has involved the area of tenure and employment contracts. In view of the diversity of the legal implications arising from these
decisions, this article, although focusing primarily on the contractual aspects
of tenure, will also include an examination of its relationship with constitutional issues so as to completely define the current legal status of tenure in
institutions of higher education. The article begins with a discussion of the
definition of tenure with its legal implications and then examines the contractual aspects of tenure such as how tenure may be created, the validity of
permanent duration contracts, the difficulty of a state modifying a vested
contract right to tenure, and, lastly, the appropriate remedies for contract
violations. It then proceeds to analyze the interrelationship between tenure
and constitutional rights, both substantive, such as first amendment-academic freedom issues, and procedural, such as fourteenth amendment due
process issues. The fmal section will use the Virginia law on the above issues

* Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. Much of this material was prepared as
part of a study on tenure submitted to the Virginia General Assembly.
1
See Brewster, 1971-72. President's Report, Yale University reprinted in 58 AAUP, BULL.
381 (1972); Van Alystyne, Tenure: A Summary, Explanation, and "Defense", 57 AAUP BULL.
328, 330 (1971.)
2
See, e.g., B. SHAW, AcADEMIC TENURE IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION (1971).
3
See W. FuRNiss, FAcULTY TENURE AND CoNTRACT SYSTEMS-CURRENT PRAcTICE (American Council on Education Special Report 1972) and cited in CoMMISSION ON AcADEMIC TENURE
IN HIGHER EDUCATION, FACULTY TENURE (1973). See generally, B. SMITH, THE TENURE DEBATE
(1973).
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to illustrate the likely outcome oflegally enforceable tenure rights in a state
without a tenure statute.
I. CREATION AND VALIDITY OF ENFORCEABLE TENURE RIGHTS

A. Tenure Defined
It is often difficult to generalize the non-legal, academic aspects of tenure.
It has been observed that:
[T]enure is embodied in a bewildering variety of policies, plans and practices; the
range reveals extraordinary differences in generosity, explicitness and intelligibility. Large or small, public or private, non-sectarian or religiously affilrated,
there is no consensus concerning either the criteria or the procedures for acquiring
and terminating tenure. 4

Tenure for centuries has been dealt with inside academic institutions and
thus has not been subjected to the outside spotlight of judicial inquiry and
interpretation as to its non-academic legal implications.
The most widely-accepted academic definition of tenure is the statement of
college and university tenure principles promulgated and adopted by the
American Association of University Professors and the Association of American Colleges which for the purpose of promoting academic freedom and
providing a degree of economic security in pertinent part provides:
After the expiration of a probationary period, teachers ... should have permanent or continuous tenure and their service should be terminated only for adequate cause, except in the case of retirement for age, or under extraordinary
circumstances because of fmancial exigencies.5

As will be discussed subsequently, recent case law brings into clearer focus
the sometimes apparent dichotomy between the theoretical principle of tenure and its practical application. On that point it has been observed:
If there is any truth to the conception of tenure as unbreakable, it is because of

institutional practices rather than because of precise protective doctrines developed by the courts. Nothing in the rationales, norms, or rules of tenure legally
shields any faculty member from accountability for performance as teacher,
scholar, and colleague. 6

The legal effect of a tenure system is to place restrictions on the power of
the employing institution to terminate tenured professors except for cause
and after a hearing. A recent leading case in discussing that power held:
Although academic tenure does not constitute a guarantee oflife employment, i.e.
tenured teachers may be released for "cause" or for reasons of the kind here
4 C. BYsE & L. JoUGHIN, TENURE IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: PLANs, PRAcTicEs, AND
THE LAw 133 (1959).
5 For complete statement and interpretations see Academic Freedom and Tenure: 1940
Statements ofPrinciples and Interpretive Comments, 60 AAUP BULL. 269 (1974). Also listed in
that publication are 88 professional associations including the Association of American Law
Schools which have endorsed the principles.
6 CoMMISSION ON AcADEMic TENURE IN HIGHER EDUCATION, FAcULTY TENURE 190 (1973).
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involved [financial exigency], it denotes clearly defined limitations upon the
institution's power to terminate the teacher's services.7
Additionally, procedural benefits accrue to tenured professors in that (1)
tenure policies providing specific procedural standards must be followed
explicitly unless waived by the parties involved, 8 (2) the employing institution in order to terminate a tenured professor has the two-fold burden of (a)
proving that "adequate cause" exists and (b) initiating the termination
proceedings. 9
Courts have also been called upon to judicially determine institutional
policies relating to the meaning of the term "adequate cause". The Nevada
Supreme Court in reviewing the dismissal of a tenured professor stated that
"cause" means legal cause, and not merely any cause deemed su£ficient. 10
That is, it had to be of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and
interest of the public and had to touch the qualifications or performance of the
professor's duties, showing that he is not a fit or proper person to hold the
position. Of course the university regillations can be more specific and more
carefully define "cause" as including incompetency, immorality, misconduct,
neglect of duty, incapacity, and insubordination. 11 The courts have varied in
their approach as to whether they will make an independent review of the
substantive charge12 or place more emphasis on the procedures followed thus
deferring to academic judgments. 13 In the final analysis, although the courts
may wish to give deference to such institutional judgments, in recent years
the courts have been inclined to intervene and provide legal interpretations of
adequate cause. 14
B. Creation of Contractual Tenure Rights
Tenure may be obtained by faculty members following a probationary
period after having met prescribed institutional standards. Quite commonly
the authority to grant tenure may be found in a comprehensive statutory
scheme which provides the right to continued employment subject only to
removal in a prescribed manner for enumerated, causes. 15 For example in
AAUP v. Bloomfield, 129 N.J. Super. 249, 322 A.2d 846, 853 (1974), aff'd 346 A.2d 615 (App.
Div. 1975). For similar holdings see Zumwalt v. Trustees of the California State Colleges, 33
Cal. App. 3d, 109 Cal. Rptr. 344 (1973) and Gould v. Board of Education of Ashley Community
Consolidated School Dist. No. 15 of Washington County, 32 Til. App. 3d 808, 336 N.E. 2d 69
(1975).
8 Gould, supra note 7. Mabey v. Reagan, 376 F. Supp. 216 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Bowingv. Board
ofTrustees of Green River Community ColJege Dist., 11 Wash. App. 33, 521 P.2d 220 (1974).
9 See, e.g., AAUP v. Bloomfield College, supra note 7, and Chung v. Park, 377 F. Supp. 524,
529 (M.D. Pa. 1974). This is contrasted with burdens of proof on the nontenured professor.
Frazier v. Curators of University of Mo., 495 F.2d 1149, 1153 (8th Cir. 1974); Fluker v. Alabama
State Board of Education, 441 F.2d 201, 206 (5th Cir. 1971).
10 State ex rel. Richardson v. Board of Regents, 70 Nev. 144, 261 P.2d 515 (1953).
11 See B. SHAw supra note 2, at 62-65.
12 State ex rel. Richardson, supra note 10.
13 See, e.g., Koch v. Board ofTrustees, 39 Til. App. 2d 51, 187 N.E. 2d 340 (1962), cert. denied,
375 u.s. 989 (1964).
14 See, e.g., Chung v. Park, 514 F.2d 382 (3d Cir. 1975).
15 For interpretations under such systems, see Annot., 66 A.L.R.3d 1018 (1975).
7

282

(

Journal of Law & Education

Vol. 6, No.3

Virginia the public school teachers after a probationary period are granted
"continuing contracts" during good behavior and competent service. 16 Alternatively, a statute (or in the case of a private college, a charter and by-laws)
may grant the authority to the college or university governing board to enter
into contracts with faculty members. The board, pursuant to a tenure policy
then grants tenure as part of the employment agreement. The agreement
may explicitly state that tenure has been awarded or the agreement may
incorporate by reference the university handbook containing tenure regulations. Additionally, "de facto tenure" or implied contractual rights may arise
so as to cre.ate an expectancy in future employment. Whether this expectancy
will rise to the level of an enforceable contract will depend on state law;
however, the Supreme Court in Perry v. Sindermann held that when a
faculty member has a concrete expectancy in future employment fostered by
the educational institution then he is entitled to pre-termination procedural
due process in order to prove the validity of his claim. 17
The award of tenure typically follows a faculty recommendation and then
mu8t be approved by an affirmative act of the educational institution as
opposed to a passive or automatic right of a faculty member meeting the
standards following the probationary period. However, in a very few but
recent cases, tenure has been granted by default. 18 In those cases the tenure
provisions called for the award of tenure or dismissal after certain time
periods; the failure of the educational institution to implement its decision to
dismiss within the prescribed time caused the court to hold that the professors
were entitled to tenure. Other cases have held contrary. For example in a
case in which an arbitrator awarded reinstatement to a professor who had not
been timely notified, the court reversed and held that reinstatement would be
tantamount to awarding tenure, a matter left solely to the discretion of the
governing board by statutory right. 19

1. Formation of Contracts for Tenure Through Incorporation By Reference
Assuming the lack of explicit statutory authority creating tenure rights,
the authorization permitting such arrangements usually flows from the
statutorily created right of a governing board to enter into contracts with its
faculty. Absent statutory or constitutional limitations the normal doctrines of
contract law will then govern the legal relationship between the faculty and
the board. Therefore if a board enters into an agreement with a faculty
member granting tenure there should be little doubt that a contract has been
formed subject to the subsequent discussion regarding the validity of such
"permanent duration" contracts.
VA. ConE ANN. §§22-217.1 to 217.8 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
408 U.S. 593 (1972). The rights of faculty members to procedural due process will be
discussed subsequently in Section II.
18 Chung v. Park, supra, note 14. Bruno v. Detroit Institute of Technology, 51 Mich. App.
593, 215 N. W. 2d 745 (1974); and see, Cusamano v. Ratchford, 507 F.2d 980 (8th Cir. 1974). But
see, Sheppard v. West Virginia Board of Regents, 378 F. Supp. 4 (S.D. W.Va. 1974).
19 Legislative Conference of City University of New York v. Board of Higher Education of
City of New York, 38 App. Div. 2d 478, 330 N.Y.S. 2d 688 (1972).
16
17
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The Supreme Court has suggested the context within which a discussion of
the formation and validity of contracts for tenure may take place in that it
has acknowledged the validity of written contracts with explicit and implied
tenure provisions, and has noted:
. . . The law of contracts in most, if not all, jurisdictions long has employed a
process by which agreements though not formalized in writing may be 'implied.'
... Explicit contractual provisions may be supplemented by other agreements
implied from 'the promisor's words and conduct in the light of the surrounding
circumstances.' ... And, '[t]he meaning of [the promisor's] words and acts is
found by relating them to the usage of the past.'20

The Court went on to say that there may well be an unwritten common law in
a particular university that certain employees shall have the equivalent of
tenure; but the Court did indicate the legal validity of such arrangements
would ·depend on relevant state law. 21 The Court ultimately held that the
professor be given an opportunity to prove the legitimacy of such claim, a task
which is undertaken in the following pages.
Formation of a contract for tenure, as stated above, may come about even
though not explicitly stated in the employment agreement. This is accomplished by the doctrine of incorporation by reference which may make college
regulations part of the contract either directly by express reference to them or
indirectly by implying their incorporation through a process of interpretation.
Courts have sanctioned both approaches. For example an express statement by the parties that the rules of the handbook are to be incorporated by
reference into the employment contract provides the basis of a courts finding
that the entire agreement includes definitions, procedural and substantive
rights which are in the handbook and relate to tenure and notification
requirements. 22
A more general reference in the agreement that the "rules and regulations"
of the university are included also causes the courts to include the handbook's
definition and rights of tenure23 as part of the agreement through the usual
processes of contract interpretation. 24
Most commonly the parties to a lawsuit stipulate or the court holds that the
handbook is impliedly incorporated as part of the total employment agreement.25 For example in Greene v. Howard University the court found:

Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-602 (1972) and see Justice Burger (concur) I d. at
603. For general discussion see 3A A. CoRBIN, CoNTRAcTs §§561-572 A (1960).
21 Id. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) the Court in defining property
interests points out they are created by " ... existing rules or understandings that stem from
an independent source such as state law rules, or understandings that secure certain benefits
and support claims of entitlement to those benefits."
22 ASSAF v. University of Texas System, 399 F. Supp. 1245, 1248 (S.D. Tex. 1975); and see
Downs v. Conway School District, 328 F. Supp. 338, 349 (E.D. Ark. 1971); State v. Avers, 108
Mont. 547, 92 P.2d 306, 310 (1939).
23 Collins v. Parsons College, 203 N.W. 2d 594 (Iowa 1973).
24 Hillis v. Meister, 82 N.M. 484, 483 P.2d 1314, 1315 (1971).
20
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The employment contract of appellants here comprehend as essential parts of
themselves the hiring policies and practices of the University as embodied in its
employment regulations and customs. 26

The court moreover found that appellants had legitimate basis to rely on the
regulations as part of the employment agreement and to the extent a valid
contractual arrangement would not be found the University would be
estopped under the familiar contract principle of promissory estoppel. 27
This widely accepted proposition of impliedly incorporating regulations by
reference is extremely significant in that it may create an enforceable contract for tenure even though tenure has not been explicitly provided for in the
written employment agreement, although of course it is pursuant to University policy. A perhaps cautionary observation of this developing area oflaw is
stated in Greene:
[C]ontracts are written and are to be read, by reference to the norms of conduct
and expectations founded upon them. This is especially true of contracts in and
among a community of scholars, which is what a university is. The readings of the
market place are not invariably apt in this non-commercial context. 26

2. Efficacy of Disclaimers
Some universities seeking to negate the formation of a contract for tenure
by incorporation of the regulations in the handbook have placed a statement
in the handbook expressly disclaiming its effectiveness as a basis of contract
obligation. However in those few cases which have litigated the matter the
effectiveness of these disclaimers has been seriously questioned if not limited.
For example in Greene v. Howard University the D. C. Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a private university having on one hand granted certain
notice rights to the faculty regarding non-reappointment could not on the
other hand effectively stipulate: "without any contractual obligation to do
so." 29
25 Adamian v. Jacobsen, 523 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1975); Cus!JIIlano v. Ratchford, supra note 18,
at 982; Browzin v. Catholic University of America, 527 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Downs v.
Conway School District, supra note 22; AAUP v. Bloomfield College, supra note 7, at 847; Rehor
v. Case Western Reserve, 32 Ohio St.2d 224, 331 N.E. 2d 416 (1975); Bruno v. Detroit Institute of
Technology, supra note 18, at 747; Greene v. Howard University, 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
hereinafter cited as Greene; Hillis v. Meister, supra note 24; Zimmerman v. Mindt, 198 N. W. 2d
108 (N.D. 1972).
26
Greene, supra note 25.
27
Id. at 1134 note 8, citing RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRACTS §90 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1965)
and Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 343
(1969).
28 Greene; and see Georgia Ass'n. of Education v. Harris, 403 F. Supp. 961, 964 (N.D. Ga.
1975).
29
Greene, supra note 25; see also J. WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS §610B at 533 (3d ed. 1961)," ...
courts have the power to inquire into the real purpose of the agreement; language, though
seemingly plain and clear, will not bear a literal interpretation if this leads to an absurd result
or thwarts the manifest intention of the parties." See also Moran v. Standard Oil, 211 N.Y. 187,
105 N.E. 217 (1914).
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A similar result is found in a case involving a public university wherein the
university disclaimed the efficacy of the regulations as "not contractual."30
The Court however in finding the regulations effectively incorporated also
held that the disclaimer was ineffective in that the "course of conduct'' of the
parties in regularly following the handbook regulations demonstrated that it
..."considered [it] to govern the University's relationship with plaintiff ...
in managing the University."31
As to whether this type of contract interpretation was applicable to a public
institution the court responded:
Our answer is that the issues here does not involve the public or private
character of the University . ... The issue here simply involves the law of
contracts. 32 (ephasis added)

The Supreme Court of Ohio in a different but related case, Rehor v. Case
Western Reserve University, has held that a properly worded reservation of
rights in the handbook33 will permit a university to change a retirement
policy that was part of the handbook regulations incorporated into faculty
employment contracts, 34 but that will not necessarily change the above
result.

3. Vesting of Contract Rights
The Rehor case raises the significant additional issue of whether employment contract rights, especially as regards the grant of tenure, once vesting
can be subsequently modified by the employing institution. The majority of
the court in Rehor held that according to rules in the University handbook it
could modify its retirement policy. It also held that faculty agreements which
had incorporated the earlier retirement policy could be subsequently modified
if supported by consideration. The dissent argued that proper contract analysis would find that although the University had the power to change its
retirement policy it had the concomitant duty to compensate those adversely
affected. It added that a clearer reading of the policies incorporated into the
contract " . . . suggests that something akin to a 'grandfather clause' is
necessary for those faculty members adversely affected." 35 The majority found
sufficient evidence existed to support its reasoning that the professor's earlier
vested contractual retirement rights were subsequently modified by the
changed policy (pursuant to an approved procedure also included in the
handbook) and accepted by the professor who agreed to subsequent employ30

Hillis v. Meister, supra note 24, at 1316-17.
ld. at 1317; see also Bradley v. New York University, 124 N.Y.S. 2d 238 (Sup. Ct. 1953),
aff'd, 283 App. Div. 671, 127 N.Y.S. 2d 815, aff'd m.em., 307 N.Y. 620, 120 N.E. 2d 828 (1954).
32
Hillis v. Meister, supra note 24, at 1317.
33 43 Ohio St. 2d 224, 331 N.E. 2d 416, 421 (1975). "The Board of Trustees shall from time to
time adopt such rules and regulations governing the appointment and tenure of members of the
several faculties as said board designates."
34
ld. at 422.
35 Id. at 424.
31
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ment contracts which incorporated the new policies. 36 The Court found that
salary increases in the subsequent employment contracts provided adequate
consideration to support the new modifying agreement. 37 Agreement on the
precise holding of Rehor may be difficult; it appears to stand for the proposition that contract rights may vest and be subsequently modified by an
agreement supported by consideration. The question of whether the retirement policy, the subject matter of the vested right, could have been changed
absent the contractual reservation to change policies including that right was
not before the court and thus the resolution of the vesting issue absent
modification supported by new consideration will be left to the contract law of
each state. 38

4. Tenure as a Restriction on Restructuring Academic Programs

I

A related question is the extent to which tenure may restrict a state or
educational institution in its restructuring or discontinuing academic programs which cause the displacement of tenured faculty. It is well established
that tenure does not provide a guarantee against institutional change. As
discussed earlier, typical tenure procedures provide that tenured faculty may
be terminated for justifiable reasons, which include the AAUP recommended
bases offmancial exigency, discontinuance of a program or department, or for
medical reasons. 39 To begin the analysis one must first assume that tenure is
validly created and enforceable as an employment contract right and that
AAUP recommended regulations are part of the contract either because they
are incorporated by reference directly or through contract interpretation as
custom and usage. 40
"Financial exigency'' which justifies termination of a tenured faculty me:plber, as defined by Regulation 4 of the AAUP Recommended Regulations on
Academic Freedom and Tenure, occurs when "an imminent financial crisis"
exists "which threatens the survival of the institution as a whole and which
cannot be alleviated by less drastic means."41 Recent case law has held such
36

But see Collins v. Parsons College, supra note 23, at 598, where the court finds that
acceptance of new one year contracts did not waive contract rights to tenure.
37
Rehor v. Case Western Reserve University, supra note 25, at 331 and 421. For analysis
questioning the courts reasoning, see Finkin, Contract, Tenure, and Retirement: A Comment on
Rehor v. Case Western Reserve, 4 HUMAN RIGHTS 343 (1975).
38 There remains of course the developing analogous case law which holds that university
regulations are part of the faculty member's employment contract and must be adhered to; see
supra n.25; and see Decker v. Worcester Junior College, 336 N.E. 2d 909 (Mass. 1975);
Fredericks v. School Board of Monroe County, 307 So. 2d463 (Fla.1975); ASSAF v. University
of Texas System, 399 F. Supp. 1245 (S.D. Tex. 1975); Mabey v. Reagan, 376 F. Supp. 216, 223
(N.D. Cal. 1974); and Bowing v. Board of Trustees of Green River Community College Dist.,
supra note 8. An additional issue discussed subsequently deals with the issue of whether vested
contract rights are protected by the constitution from impairment by subsequent legislation.
39 Termination of Faculty Appointments Because of Financial Exigency, Discontinuance of a
Program or Department, or Medical Reasons [Regulation 4], 62 AAUP BULL. 17 (1976).
40 See e.g., Browzin v. Catholic University of America, 527 F.2d 843-;847-848 (D.C. Cir.
1975).
41 Id.; for a thorough discussion of this policy in its legal context, see Brown, Financial
Exigency, 62 AAUP BULL. 5 (1976).
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regulations to be enforceable. In AAUP v. Bloomfield College 42 the New
Jersey court upheld the "financial exigency'' restriction on the University's
authority to terminate tenured faculty and defined the phrase as «an immediate, compelling crisis."43 The reviewing court in affirming this holding stated
"not only must the financial exigency be demonstrably bona fide but the
termination because of that exigency must also be bona fide." 44 The rationale
for that point is found in Browzin v. Catholic University of America45 a
similar, recent case decided by the D. C. Court of Appeals which in enforcing
the AAUP regulation in pertinent part held:
But the obvious danger remains that "financial exigency" can become too easy
an excuse for dismissing a teacher who is merely unpopular or controversial
or misunderstood-a way for the university to rid itself of an unwanted
teacher....46

In further defining the term "financial exigency'' a recent Iowa decision,
without significant discussion, found the term to mean "current operating
deficit."47 Two other decisions involve the situation where the legislatures of
Nebraska and Wisconsin cut appropriations which arguably necessitated a
reduction in the number of faculty at the state educational institutions. 48
Although the actual issue dealt with was the constitutional adequacy of
termination procedures, the court in holding that the tenured faculty were
properly dismissed also found that financial exigency existed, though that
aspect was not developed in the opinion. It is important to note that the court
required that an opportunity be provided to demonstrate the bona fideness of
reasons for dismissal.
Under the 1976 AAUP regulations, a tenured faculty member may be
properly terminated if his program or department is discontinued. While this
should resolve the initial inquiry as to whether a state is fettered in its ability
to restructure academic programs within and between institutions, obligations and unanswered questions remain. The obligations suggested by the
regulations include faculty-administration discussions on appropriate procedures to be followed and alternatives to be explored relevant to the restructuring and its effects. One of those obligations, the duty of the institution to
assist displaced faculty members in finding "another suitable position'' has
been litigated.49 In Browzin v. Catholic University of America50 the D. C.
42

129 N.J. Super. 249, 322 A. 2d 846 (1974), affd, 346 A. 2d 615 (App. Div. 1975).
Id. at 858 (1974).
44
346 A. 2d 615, 617 (1975).
45 527 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
46
Id. at 847.
47
Lumpert v. University of Dubuque (unreported 1974), on appeal to Iowa Supreme Court,
Case No. 2-57568 (1975).
48
Levitt v. Board of Trustees of Nebraska State Colleges, 376 F. Supp. 945 (D. Neb. 1974);
Johnson v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System, 377 F. Supp. 227 (W.D.
Wis. 1974) (under the Wisconsin statute no provision is made for the displacement of faculty
members for financial exigency). Wis. STAT. ANN. §§37.31 (1) (a), (b) (Supp. 1974).
49
This duty exists both in fmancial exigency and discontinuance of programs or departments cases.
50
527 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
43

288

Journal of Law & Education

Vol. 6, No.3

Court of Appeals enforced that duty, arising from the employment contract
which included the AAUP regulations, and held:
The University did discontinue Browzin's program of instruction. It was therefore
under an obligation to make every effort to find him another suitable position in
the institution.51

Unanswered questions remain as to what constitutes a "program"; for example, if a line of courses is phased out such as nuclear physics, is that sufficient
to justify termination?52 In sum, the state is not restricted by tenure in its
ability to restructure programs which causes displacement of tenured faculty
except to the extent the institution may be obligated to help cushion the
effects and be called upon in open hearing to justify its policy.

5. Validity of Tenure Contracts
Once deciding that a contract for tenure may be formed, the question arises
wh~ther such contracts are supported by sufficient legal consideration to be

valid and enforceable. Issues of contract law involving the legal consideration
questions revolve about the indefiniteness of the duration and compensation
of the contract, the apparent lack of mutuality of obligation, and whetqer a
contract for tenure under usual contract law principles is a contract for
permanent employment which may be invalid because of lack of consideration. Though this is largely an untested issue in tenure contracts in higher
education, some case law is available to generalize as to the validity of such
agreements. 53
A summary of contract law outside the· area of higher education finds:
Ordinarily, an employment agreement which mentions no period of duration,
and is in a true sense made indefinite thereby, will be construed as being
terminable at will by either party, and the burden of proving the contrary must be
assumed by the party asserting that the employment was for a definite period. 54

However many courts will not find such agreements unenforceable due to
lack of mutuality or indefiniteness where the intent of the parties as to
duration is ascertainable from the agreement, custom and usage, and the
nature of the employment.55 The Supreme Court has upheld the validity of
such agreements stating that they are not against public policy. 56 Also courts
have found that where consideration is given additional to the usual services
to be performed, it will enforce permanent duration agreements. 57 For examI d. at 849.
The regulation states that the decision to discontinue a program should be based "essentially upon educational considerations" and an explanatory note points out that this term is not
intended to include "cyclical or temporary variations in enrollment." Regulation 4 (d) (1), 62
AAUP BULL. 17, 19 (1976).
53 See generally Annot., 60 A.L.R. 3d 226 (1974).
5 4 Id. at 232, n.10.
55 I d.; see A. CoRBIN, CoNTRACTS §96 (1963).
56 Pierce v. Tennessee C.I. & R. Co., 173 U.S. 1 (1899). See also Littrell v. Evening Star
Newspaper, 120 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
57 See, e.g., Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. Foar, 84 F.2d 67 (7th Cir. 1936).
51

52
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ple, in Simmons v. California Institute ofTechnology58 a contract for permanent employment supported by consideration additional to the services incident to the employment was upheld for as long as the employer remains in
business and the employee is able and willing to do his work satisfactorily.
Some courts have suggested that additional consideration is not necessary to
support a contract for permanent employment:
If it is their purpose, parties may enter into a contract for permanent employment-not terminable except pursuant to its express terms-by stating clearly their
intention to do so, even though no other consideration than services to be performed
is expected by the employer or promised by the employee.59

Cases arising in higher education that have addressed the question are few
but for the most part contracts of tenure have been upheld. It is perhaps
instructive to note that in recent years very few cases60 have questioned the
enforceability of tenure for want of sufficient consideration. 61 This, in part,
could be due to the fact the purpose of the parties in granting "permanent''
employment, though atypical in non-educational settings, is the norm in
higher education and is clearly intended and stated as institutional policy
which is incorporated by reference into the employment agreement. The purpose or rationale for this type of contractual provision, as discussed earlier, is
not only to provide job security but also to protect academic freedom. The recent case in New Jersey, Bloomfield College, 62 in discussing the purpose of
academic tenure went on to observe that although no assurance of life employment accrues with tenure, once it has been attained
"it denotes clearly defined limitations upon the institution's power to terminate
the teacher's services."63

One recent lower state court decision in Iowa has held that agreements for
tenure without additional consideration are unenforceable. 64 In a second case
in Iowa, Collins v. Parsons College, 65 the state Supreme Court enforced a
tenure provision finding that the relinquishment of a tenure contract elsewhere in exchange for the new tenure contract was sufficient additional
consideration. Though the issue of the absence of mutuality of obligation was
raised in that the professor unlike the university, could terminate his employment at the end of any academic year, the co~ found it was unnecessary
to decide on that basis since other consideration was present. The court on
that issue however did observe:
58

194 P.2d 521 (1948), Phg., 34 Cal. 2d 264, 209 P.2d 581 (1949).
Littrell v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., supra note 56, at 36; and see, Ellen v. Tappan's
Inc., 16 N.J. Super. 53, 83 A.2d 817 (1951).
60 See, e.g., Lumpert v. University of Dubuque, supra note 47.
61 See, e.g., Bruno v. Detroit Institute of Technology, supra note 18; Rhine v. International
YMCA College, 339 Mass. 610, 162 N.E. 2d 56 (1956); State ex rel. Keeney v. Ayers, 108 Mont.
547, 92 P.2d 306 (1939).
62 129 N.J. Super. 249, 322 A.2d 846 (1974); affd, 346 A.2d 615 (App. Div. 1975).
63 Id. at 853.
64 Lumpert v. University of Dubuque, supra note 47.
65 203 N.W. 2d 594 (1973).
59
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We have considerable doubt that an agreement for tenure such as this one
requires mutuality in any event, as to duration of the employment. Tenured
teachers in institutions of higher learning have permanent positions as spelled
out in the bylaws of their institutions, just as civil servants have permanent
positions as spelled out in statutes. Yet such teachers and servants are free to
resign if they wish. . . . Promises must be mutually obligatory if they constitute
the only consideration for each other. But if a promise is supported by other
consideration, it is enforceable although the promisee has the right to terminate
his undertaking or indeed makes no promise at all, as is the case of unilateral
contracts. 66
The court in restating principles of contract law continued that although lack
of mutuality may amount to a lack of consideration, the mere lack of mutuality itself does not render a contract invalid.
If.mutual promises be the mutual consideration of a contract, then each promise
must be enforceable in order to render the other enforceable. Though consideration is essential to the validity of the contract, it is not essential that such
consideration consist of a mutual promise. . . . This is true of all unilateral

contracts which are supported by consideration.5 7
The issue then becomes whether consideration exists to support the agreement. Consideration has been defined many ways including consisting of a
detriment to promisee, 68 which detriment does need to move to the promisor. 69
An increasing number of courts have come to recognize that the doctrine of
promissory estoppel as a substituted form of consideration, where consideration would be otherwise lacking. 70 The dominant element which must be present under the doctrine is that of justifiable detrimental reliance on the
promise, which if present may preclude the promisor from asserting the lack
of consideration.
Unanswered and untested issues remain in higher education on those
issues. Whether no special consideration (other than providing services) is
necessary or whether the implicit surrender of potential job opportunities by
acceptance of a tenured position at an institution would satisfy the consideration requirement is a matter left to future litigation under each state's
contract law. It has been decided, at least in Iowa, that a clearly bargained for
exchange of a tenured position at one institution will support a contract for
tenure at another institution, 71 although other courts have had different
approaches on that issue. 72 Whether courts will accept the promissory
Id. at 598.
Id.
68 17 AM. JUR. 2d Contracts §96 at 438 (1964); 17 C.J.S. Contracts §70 at 747 (1963).
69 RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcTS §75, Comment e (1932).
70
See Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958); see, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS 2d §90 (Tentative Draft Nos. 1-7, 1973) Seavey, Reliance Upon Gratuitous
Promises or Other Conduct, 64 HARv. L. REv. 913 (1951).
71 Collins v. Parsons College, supra note 23.
72
53 AM. JUR. 2dMaster & Servant §33 at 108-109 (1970); 56 C.J.S. Master & Servant §6 at
66
67

64, 70-71 (1948); Annot., 135 A.L.R. 646, 669-673 (1941).
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estoppel doctrine as a substituted form of consideration or will continue to bypass the issue as unnecessary for discussion remains to be seen. 73

6. Issues Affecting Enforceability
Other contract issues which could arise and affect the enforceability of
tenure contracts include (1) lack of authority of university officials to enter
into such contracts because of either constitutional or statutory limitations;
(2) contractual waiver of rights; (3) statute of frauds in the case of informal
oral tenure plans; and possibly (4) the contract doctrine of the parol evidence
rule, a contract law doctrine which may preclude evidence of a tenured position if the employment contract is silent on it.
Constitutional limitations on the university's authority may arise from two
sources: (1) the contract clause in the U. S. constitution74 which prohibits
states from impairing contract obligations it has entered into, and (2) a state
constitution's reservation of "full control" which may prohibit delegation of
that authority. The Supreme Court in Indiana ex rel Anderson v. Brand75 held
that an Indiana Statute which created contractual tenure rights in teachers
could not be subsequently abrogated by legislation negating tenure rights in
that it unconstitutionally impaired the obligation of the originally entered
into tenure contracts. The Court admitted that every contract is made subject
to the implied condition that its fulfillment may be validly frustrated by a
proper exercise of the police power. 76 The dissent argued that the Indiana
legislature remained free to change .its legislative policy over educational
matters, since such power was reserved by the State Constitution, and that
teachers' tenure rights were statutory and not contractual rights and were
thus repealable. 77
A more common situation is where the state constitution is found to reserve
to the legislature the power to change, modify or abolish policies relating to
schools. For example in Malone v. Hayden the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that teachers' contracts impliedly incorporated the constitutional
requirement that permitted the subsequent legislative modification of the
state tenure law and thus modification of the tenure contract was not impermissible.78 In summary, whether the Constitution will preclude modification
of contracts for tenure depends wholly on judicial interpretations of state
constitutions and pertinent state statutes and therefore does not lend itself to
generalization.
A second potential source oflimitation on a university's authority to grant
tenure may be found in a constitutional restriction which may limit the power
73

See generally, J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CoNTRACTS 180-187 (1970), for development of
modem trends of this doctrine.
74
U.S. CoNST. art. I, §10.
75
303 u.s. 95 (1938).
76
I d. at 109; see State ex rel. Keeney v. Ayers, supra note 61, at 311.
77
303 U.S. 95, 112-113 (1938). The Court had held previously that a statutory tenure system
in New Jersey could be altered by subsequent legislation. Phelps v. Bd. ofEduc., 302 U.S. 74
(1937).
78
329 Pa. 213, 197 A. 344, 353 (1937).
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to delegate such authority. For example in Worzella v. Board of Regents/9
the Supreme Court of South Dakota invalidated a tenure plan on the basis it
improperly restricted the board's constitutionally granted power to maintain
the college "under the control of" the board. 80 The court viewed the board's
constitutional power of removal of faculty as absolute and thus not susceptible of restriction by the tenure system. 81 However, the doctrine of illegal
delegation to a great degree in recent years has been ameliorated by courts
finding that public entities generally have broad authority to delegate matters which in earlier years would have been viewed as improper interference
with the sovereign powers of the state. 82
Statutory limitations may also affect the enforceability of tenure contracts.
A clear limitation would be statutes which authorize universities t<>remove
personnel "at will". While some courts have held tlfat tenure and related
personnel policies are restricted by such statutes, 83 others have held that
having to comply with reasonable restrictions, such as following certain
procedures in the removal process, does not impair the authority of the
governing board and is not therefore prohibited by such statues. 84 This latter
interpretation permits an aggrieved faculty member to sue for breach of
contract while at the same time reserving to the governing board the ultimate
power to dismiss.
Another potential statutory obstacle to enforcement of tenure contracts is
whether a university may enter into such agreements absent explicit statutory authorization. To do so a university would be acting on authority implied
from general, explicit statutory authorization such as "the authority to enter
into employment contracts with faculty'' and to "make and enforce rules and
regulations." Early case law demonstrates judicial conservatism on this issue
and implied powers often were not found; however in recent years a discernible trend of case law has emerged which makes it not unlikely that implied
authority would be found to support such contracts including those for tenure.85
The contract doctrine of waiver may be introduced into the discussion
regarding the legal enforceability of tenure contracts. A waiver is defined as a
relinquishment of a known right and can arise in tenure contracts in a couple
of ways. 86 First a professor who is granted a tenure contract other than by
explicit statutory provision may commonly be provided only a one year con79 77 S.D. 447, 93 N. W. 2d 411 (1958). But see Byse, Academic Freedom, Tenure, and the Law:
A Comment on Worzella v. Board of Regents, 73 HARv. L. REv. 304 (1959).
80 Worzella v. Bd. of Regents, id at 413.
81
A similar holding was rendered in the sister-state of North Dakota. Posin v. State Bd. of
Higher Educ., 86 N.W. 2d 31 (N.D. 1957).
82 See, e.g., Norwalk Teachers' Assoc. v. Bd. ofEduc., 138 Conn. 269 82 A.2d 624 (1951); an
illustration of the older view is found in City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239,206 S.W. 2d
539 (1947).
83 See state ex rel. Hunsicker v. Bd. of Regents, 209 Wis. 83, 244 N.W. 618 (1932); Hyslop v.
Bd. of Regents, 23 Idaho 341, 129 P.1073 (1913).
84 See, e.g., State Bd. of Agriculture v. Meyers, 20 Colo. App. 139, 77 P.372 (1904).
85 See, e.g., Dayton Classroom Teachers Ass'n. v. Dayton Bd. ofEduc., 41 Ohio St. 2d 127,
323 N.E. 2d 714 (1975);seealso Batchellorv. Commonwealth, 176Va.109, 105 S.E. 529 (1940).
86 For a discussion of waiver, see State ex rel. Keeney v. Ayers, supra note 61, at 310.
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tract. The question can arise whether the acceptance of a one year contract is
a waiver of the right to "permanent duration employment" provided by
tenure. Few courts have addressed this specific issue but one such court was
the Supreme Court oflowa which in upholding the enforceability of a tenure
contract held that the professor " . . . did not waive his right of tenure by
executing written contracts carrying out the original agreement in individual
years."87 Even where such one year agreements did not specify continued
tenure rights, the earlier discussion regarding the implied incorporation by
reference of university regulations granting tenure rights should lead one to
conclude that the waiver argument is largely ineffectual.
The waiver argument, which can also preclude inconsistent positions, may
arise where a university indicates satisfaction or lack of dissatisfaction with a
professor's work. For example in Bruno v. Detroit Institute of Technology 88
where tenure was to be awarded following a prescribed period, a combination
of factors inCluding the failure to properly notify the professor of an adverse
tenure decision, renewal of yearly contracts, a promotion, and lack of criticism regarding his performance caused the court to award tenure and preclude the university from taking an inconsistent position. Though this type of
case (which is to some extent entangled with statutory mandates) does not
present the clear cut issue of whether a university which offers or awards
tenure if certain criteria are met may thereafter change its position where
there has been reliance on the continuance of the system, it at least suggests
the possible availability of such argument. 89
Related to the waiver argument is the earlier discussed doctrine ofpromissory estoppel which may provide consideration either to create an enforceable'
contract or to make an offer irrevocable. 90 Thus in the context of higher
education it may be that the offer of an institution to grant tenure or the
actual awarding of tenure makes the offer irrevocable where the professor
reasonably relies on it. Professor Corbin in his treatise on contracts has
observed:
Where one party makes a promissory offer in such a form that it can be accepted
by the rendition of the performance that it accepted in exchange ... the offeror is
bound by a contract just as soon as the offeree has rendered a substantial part of
the that requested performance.91

Though there appears to be no cases in higher education on tenure contracts
which raise this issue, the analogy is obvious. A university by awarding
tenure to a professor promises to honor its offer for continued employment if
I d.; Collins v. Parsons College, supra note 23.
51 Mich. App. 593, 215 N.W. 2d 745 (1974).
89 The question of whether application of such a doctrine would in fact vest contract rights so
as to preclude a university from later changing its policy vis-a-vis that faculty member is
discussed supra, in text accompanying notes 34-38.
90 See, RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRACTS 2d §§45 and 24 A (Tentative Draft Nos. 1-7·1973). It has
also been held that since a "unilateral contract is not founded on mutual promises, the doctrine
of mutuality of obligation is inapplicable to such a contract." Chrisman v. S. Cal. Edison Co.,
83 Cal. App. 249, 256 P.618, 621 (1927); see also Oliver v. Wyatt, 418 S.W. 2d 403 (Ky. Ct. App.
1967).
91 1 A. CORBIN, CoNTRAcTS §49 at 187 (1963).
87

88
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the professor meets the job requirements; the professor's continued reliance
on this offer creates an irrevocable offer that can be subsequently accepted by
the professor. 92
A third area of contract law which could affect the enforceability of tenure
contracts deals with the statute of frauds and parol evidence rule. The statute
of frauds of each state gen,erally requires certain types of contracts to be
written; for example, those not capable of performance within a year from the
time of their formation (such as "permanent employment'' contacts).93 Thus, a
university's informal oral tenure policy may not comply with the statute and
be unenforceable. 94 However, the modern trend of cases fmds that contracts
based on o~e's "life" are capable ofpreformance within one year inasmuch as
the contingency might become effective in less than a year. 9'? As most contracts for tenure are written either expressly or through incorporating by
refereJlCe the pertinent handbook provisions, there would seem to be few legal
problems involving tenure with the statute of frauds. 96
The parol evidence rule of contract law precludes admission of evidence of
prior oral understandings which contradict a subsequent written agreement
which is fully integrated. 97 The application of the rule could arise where an
oral promise of tenure was followed by a later written contract of employment
that omitted such a provision. Whether evidence of the earlier alleged oral
agreement would be admissible depends on the court's view of whether the
written agreement was so fully integrated vis-a-vis the terms and conditions
of employment that it would likely have been included in the agreement. It is
most likely that the court will find that the fully integrated agreement includes the handbook regulations which will incorporate by reference the tenure provisions. If on the contrary the court finds the agreement is fully integrated, the evidence will be excluded. However, even if a court would exclude
such evidence, it is possible that it could come in through the process of
interpreting the meaning of the agreement. 98 Thus far this issue has not been
raised as a troublesome one in tenure contracts in higher education.
7. Contract Remedies for Breach of Tenure Contract

A fmal element important to considering the legal ramifications of contracts for tenure involves the legal remedy which the court will award in the
event a breach of contract is found. The traditional contract rule in employment contracts is to award damages rather than specific performance except
This also might present an argument in favor of the "vesting'' of contract rights to tenure.
60 A.L.R. 3d 317 §16.
94
Brookfield v. Drury College, 139 Mo. App. 339, 123 S.W. 86 (1909).
95
See, e.g., McGehee v. South Carolina Power Co., 187 S.C. 79, 196 S.E. 538 (1938); Dow v.
Shoe Corp. of America, 276 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1960).
96
However, even incorporation by reference can involve statute of fraud problems when
there is a question of which documents among several are to be included in the final agreement
and constitute a writing sufficient to take it outside the applicability of the statute. See, e.g.,
Crabtree v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 305 N.Y. 48, 110 N.E. 2d 551 (1953).
97
See Murray, The Parole Evidence Rule: A Clarification, 4 DuQUESNE L. REv. 337 (1966).
98
See Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parole Evidence Rule, 50 CoRNELL L. Q.
161 (1965).
92

93
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the unusual case where damages can be proved inadequate. 99 The rationale is
to avoid forcing an employer and employee into an incompatible relationship.
In higher education cases the rule is the same with damages normally being
awarded, which in case of a breach of a tenure contract can be considerable. 100
In Bruno 101 the court found a breach of a contract for tenure and after listing
how to measure the future damages including anticipated salary commented:
We feel we would be remiss if we did not hasten to add that the entire problem
of future damages could be avoided if defendant were now willing to abide by its
contractual obligation and again allow plaintiff to return to his teaching post. 102

There has been continued dissatisfaction expressed about the unavailability of specific performance in the enforcement of employment agreements in
that damages are rarely adequate due to the disruptive effect a discharge has
on one's reputation and future job opportunities and the fact that professors
are usually quite autonomous and thus do not run afoul of the usual rule
seeking to avoid incompatibility in the employment relationship. 103 Williston
in his treatise on contracts has likewise observed " . . . appealing factual
situations may occasionally induce a court to enforce a personal service
contract specifically, particularly in the absence of any personal relationship
between the parties. "104 Some recent court cases have likewise expressed
dissatisfaction and have awarded reinstatement. For example in the Bloomfield College case the court made an exception to the general rule and ordered
reinstatement where the university had failed to follow its own regulations in
dismissing for "financial exigency." Arguably this case is distinguishable
since there apparently was no dissatisfaction with services and thus reinstatement would not involve the incompatibility problem. The court stated
that specific performance should not be precluded, and noted that
... no reason appears as to why reinstatement cannot be ordered here as has been
done so often in the numerous cases involving public educational institutions. 105

The court pointed out that although those orders for reinstatement derived
mainly from statutory provisions coupled with the court's power to issue writs
of mandamus.
the substance of the action has been nothing more than to compel adherence to
academic tenure commitments on the part of an educational institution. This is
the route by which specific performance is obtained against a state body on the
basis of contracts arising from statute. 106
99 11 J. WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS §1450 (3d ed. 1968); 5A A CoRBIN CoNTRACTS §1204 (1964); and
applied in Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1967), remanded for proof
for damages in 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
100 See Bruno v. Detroit Inst. of Tech., supra note 18, at 749.
101 Id. at 750.
102
103

Id.
See generally, Comment, Academic Tenure: The Search for Standards, 39 S. CAL. L. REV.

593 (1966).
104
11 J. WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS §1124 at 786-787 (1968).
105
AAUP v. Bloomfield College, supra note 7. An additional argument that the lack of
mutuality of remedy precludes specific performance has been largely discredited. 5 A CoRBIN,
CoNTRAcTS, §1180 at 331.
106 AAUP v. Bloomfield College, supra note 7.
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The revi~wing court in affirming the granting of specific performance
added:
In view of the uncertainty in admeasuring (sic) damages because of the indefinite
duration of the contract and the importance of the status of plaintiffs in the milieu
of the college teaching profession it is evident that the remedy of damages at law
would not be complete or adequate. . . . The relief granted herein is appropriate to
achieve equity and justice. 107

In public universities, an improperly terminated tenured professor may be
entitled to reinstatement pursuant to a statutory provision. 108 And even
absent a statutory provision, professors have been ordered reinstated. 109
Though most cases arising in higher education have denied specific performance, one should not overlook the potential availability of such a remedy
(especially where damages can be argued to be inadequate) and of the wide
discretion available to courts in devising and shaping the remedy so as to fit
the changing circumstances of every case in an attempt to render the parties
whole.
II. TENURE IN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

A. Academic Freedom
The grant of tenure in addition to contributing to job stability is provided to
ensure adequate protection of academic freedom which encompasses the ideal
of virtually unrestricted freedom of intellectual thought, learning, and teaching. The D. C. Court of Appeals in a recent case dealing with the rights of a
tenured professor noted that a tenure system is designed to eliminate the
chilling effect which the threat of discretionary dismissal casts over academic
pursuits and to foster society's interest in the unfettered progress of research
and learning by protecting the profession's freedom of inquiry and instruction.110
·
·
Judge Wright further elaborated on the need to protect such interests:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is almost
self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is
played by those who guide and train our youth. To impose any straight jacket
upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the
future of our Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly comprehended by man
that new discoveries cannot yet be made .... Scholarship cannot flourish in an
atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always remain
free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding;
otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die. 111
Id. at 618.
See Matheson, Judicial Enfqrcement ofAcademic Tenure: An Examination, 50 WASHINGTON L. REV. 597, 603 (1975).
109
Cf. Pima College v. Sinclair, 17 Ariz. App. 213, 216, 496 P.2d 639, 641 (1972); and State ex
rel. Keeney v. Ayers, supra note 61.
110
Browzin v. Catholic University of America, supra note 25.
m Id. at 846 n.2.
107

108
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As significant as academic freedom is in our American tradition, no court has
squarely held that academic freedom is a distinct and legally enforceable
independent right absent and beyond constitutional guarantees. 112 The ques~
tion arises then to what extent do constitutional guarantees protect the same
values and rights that tenure is designed to protect?

B. Constitutional Rights of Faculty absent Tenure Rights

1. Substantive Rights Under the Constitution
To begin, it must be understood that the constitution regulates only public
universities and those private institutions that have become significantly
involved in governmental action, which under legal analysis, will apply the
constitution through the doctrine of "state action." 113 Under the fourteenth
amendment there are two types of rights protected, substantive, such as first
amendment rights, and procedural, such as due process~fair hearing rights.
For the most part, courts deciding cases in higher education have deferred to
internal academic judgments and have emphasized interest in proper procedures as opposed to substantive rights, with protection accorded the latter
primarily in the areas of extracurricular speech and right of association. 114
The courts, however, have not been unmindful of trying to protect where
possible some of the same interests protected by academic freedom. For
example, the Supreme Court has ruled:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of
transcendent value to all of us, and not merely to teachers concerned. That
freedom is, therefore, a specific concern of the first amendment, which does not
tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. 115

Proceeding from thai dictum, the Supreme Court has also made it clear
that professors at public universities have constitutionally guaranteed rights
regardless of a tenured or untenured status. (Of course such rights must be
vindicated in judicial proceedings rather than in institutional "cause" hearings by a jury of academic peers.) The only question then is whether legal
constitutional rights encompass the non~legal interests of academic freedom.
The leading case dealing with extracurricular free speech rights is Pickering
v. Board of Education where the Court ruled that the Board in dismissing a
teacher for publicly criticizing the Board's handling of revenue raising pro~
posals was an unconstitutional interference with the teacher's freedom of
112 See Miller, Teachers Freedom of Expression Within the Classroom: A Search for Stan~
dards, 8 GA. L. REv. 837 (1974); and K. ALEXANDER & E. SoLOMON, CoLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY

LAw 342 (Michie. 1972). It is possible of course that a university regulation requiring academic
freedom would be viewed as part of the employment contract and enforced on that basis.
113
See Schubert, State Action and the Private University, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 323 (1970).
Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1045, 1056 (1968).
114
See generally Academic Freedom, 81 P.u\RV. L. REV. 1045, 1051 (1968); Van Alstyne, The
Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DUKE L. J. 841 (1970).
115
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 598 (1972).
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speech. 116 The Court did recognize the interests of the state as employer in
regulating the speech of the citizenry in general and established a "balancing
test" between the two interests.
The courts have since tried to find the line that separates the two interests.
In Pickering the Court noted that if a teacher's utterances were so without
foundation as to call into question the person's fitness to perform his duties in
the classroom, then the statement's "would merely be evidence of the
teacher's general competence, or lack thereof, and not an independent basis
for dismissal. 117 Subsequent court rulings have narrowed the scope of protection by holding that where honest doubt exists whether adverse action was
taken because of questions of competency rather than protected constitutional
rights the court should rule in favor of the former. For example an Arizona
court held:
[l]f, judged by constitutional standards, there are valid as well as invalid reasons

for the discipline or discharge of a teacher, such discipline or discharge will not be
set aside by the federal court so long as the invalid reasons are not the primary
reasons or motivation for the discharge. 118

In 1977 the Supreme Court in Mt. Healthy City School District v. Doyle 119
rendered a far reaching decision in broadening the above rationale. It found
that a dismissal may be proper even where a "motivating factor" in the
dismissal was the teacher's exercise of conduct which is constitutionally protected. Under such circumstances, the employer may still discharge the
employee if it can show
... by a .preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same
decision as to respondent's reemployment even in the absence of the protected
conduct. 120

The Court explained its rationale by pointing out that while it wished to
protect against the invasion of constitutional rights, it wanted to do so
"without commanding undesireable consequences not necessary to the assurance of those rights."121
116

391 U.S. 563 (1968). For further discussion of developments, see Note, Judicial Protection
of Teachers' Speech: The Aftermath of Pickering, 59 IowA L. REv. 1256 (1974).
117
Pickering v. Bd. ofEduc., 391 U.S. 563, 573 n.5 (1968).
118
Starsky v. Williams, 353 F. Supp. 900, 916 (D. Ariz. 1972). See also. Duke v. North Texas
State Univ., 469 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1972); Rampev v. Allen 501 F.2d 1090 (lOth Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 95 S. Ct. 827 (1975). ·
119
97 S. Ct. 568.
120
Id. at 576. A difficult case to resolve in the past is where the exercise of constitutionally
protected speech by a teacher may interfere with effective classroom performance. For example, if a teacher uttered racial slurs outside the classroom which caused adverse student
reaction resulting in poor performance ratings, is this not the type of overriding state interest
discussed in the Pickering case? It would seem that in view of the holding in Mt. Healthy,
supra, note 119, the school's interest and burden balanced against the individual's interests
may become easier to prove.
121
!d. That is to say it wanted to avoid the situation where an employee could be placed in "a
better position as a result of the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct than he would
have had he done nothing." Id. at 575.
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In the area of constitutional rights inside the classroom, a critical part of
academic freedom, the court decisions are varied but one commentator has
taken the position that recent court decisions
... carve an area of autonomy in the classroom in which teachers teach free of
interference from school authorities and parent alike, so long as the teachers can
convince a federal court [rather than in a university proceeding] that the classroom expression is relevant to their curricular assignment, is balanced and has
educational value. 122

The Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District123 in applying a test balancing the rights of the individual
against the institutional needs of the orderly operation of a school, found that
wearing armbands was not such an interference as to be disruptive. A
sampling of judicial decisions balancing the relative interests finds that
courts have permitted and protected freedom of speech inside the classroom, 124 the teachers selection of subject matter in teaching a course, 125 and in
using teaching methods which were not universally approved but which were
not explicitly prohibited. 126 On the other hand it is perfectly clear that a state
has the ''undoubted right to prescribe the curriculum for its public schools" 127
and the concept of academic freedom does not insulate a teacher from review
by superiors on the basis of teaching style. 128
Reinstatement as a remedy available to professors who have been improperly dismissed has long been used by the courts129 and the reluctance to
order specific permforance in the employment context prevalent in contract
law principles is not in evidence. In fact, the Fifth Circuit, in upholding
reinstatement as the appropriate remedy, stated that "[e]nforcement of
constitutional rights frequently has disturbing consequences. Relief is not
restricted to that which will be pleasing and free of irritation." 130 An addi122 Nahmod, First Amendment Protection for Learning and Teaching: The Scope of Judicial
Review, 18 WAYNE L. REv.
123
393 u.s. 503 (1969).
124 Kaprelian v. Texas Woman's Univ., 509 F.2d 133, 139 (5th Cir. 1975); James v. Bd. of
Educ., 385 F. Supp. 209, 211 (W.D. N.Y. 1974).
125 Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969); Paducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352
(M.D. Ala. 1970).
126 Mailloux v. Kiley, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971); for full discussion see lower court opinion
323 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Mass. 1971). For cases dealing with "vague" prohibitions see, e.g.,
.
Doughtery v. Walker, 349 F. Supp. 629 (W.D. Mo. 1972).
127 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968).
128
See, e.g., Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705, 709 (6th Cir. 1973).
129 Statutory rights to reinstatement usually comes from 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1970) which
provides for a remedy "in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding'' for state
action resulting in "the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws" of the United States. See generally, Griffis and Wilson, Constitutional
Rights and Remedies in the Non-Renewal ofa Public School Teachers Employment Contract, 25
BAYLOR L. REV. 549·(1973); Note, Economically Necessitated Faculty Dismissals as a Limitation
on Academic Freedom, 52 DENVER L. REv. 911, 917 (1975).
130 Sterzingv. Fort Bend Indep. School Dist., 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1974). This was an obvious
reference and contrast to the usual employment contract principles refusing specific performance because it would tend to antagonize the parties in their employment relationship.
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tional remedy is that of mandamus where an improper dismissal also contravenes a statutory directive. In granting reinstatement in one such case, a
California court has held that since a statute directed reinstatement, a
teacher discharged for exercising protected constitutional rights must be
reinstated to avoid the "chilling'' effect that could occur absent the ordering of
that remedy.131
In summary, the non-legal definition of academic freedom, accepted by
most universities, encompasses (1) research and publication; (2) freedom in
the classroom; and (3) freedom as a citizen. As can be seen in the above
analysis, there has been some legal protection afforded professors in each
area. Though it is tempting to note that constitutional rights are guaranteed
professors at public universities whether or not they are tenured and thereupon conclude that these guarantees protect all of the same interests guarded
by the doctrine of academic freedom, an objective appraisal might better
conclude that though there may be a trend in that direction there are
obviously too few cases to categorically so conclude. An additional consideration is that absent institutionally-provided procedures within which to judge
academic freedom cases, the only recourse available to the university and
professor, absent a settlement, is to litigate in federal court.

2. Procedural Due Process under the Constitution
It is sometimes suggested that tenure with its requirement of a fair hearing
has become passe in view of the availability of constitutionally required due
process hearings. Though to some extent, for some public employees, this
may be accurate, a brief legal examination of the requisite standards to be
met to trigger a right to constitutional due process demonstrates that a very
large percentage of faculty members are not entitled to this procedural
protection.
a. Protected Interests
In 1972 the Supreme Court in Board of Regents v. Roth 132 and Perry v.
Sindermann 133 established standards and guidelines under which faculty
members at public institutions are entitled to procedural due process if their
termination adversely affects a "liberty'' or "property'' interest under the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court further
defined a property interest as follows.
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an
abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of
it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. 134
... Property interests, of course are not created by the constitution. Rather
they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understand131 Monroe v. Trustees of the California State Colleges, 6 Cal. 3d 399, 99 Cal. Rptr. 129, 491
P.2d 1105 (1971). See also, Note, Mandamus in Administrative Actions: Current Approaches,
1973 DUKE L. J. 207.
132 408 u.s. 564 (1972).
133 408 u.s. 593 (1972).
134 Bd. of Regents v. Roth, supra note 21.
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ings that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlements to those
benfits. 135

In applying that criteria to the cases at hand the court found that Professor
Roth, having only a one year appointment, had absolutely no interest in reemployment for the next year. Neither was there a "state statute or University rule of policy that secured his interest in employment"; thus, he was
found not to have a property interest sufficient to entitle him to a due process
hearing prior to his non-renewal. 136 In Sindermann, where the institution
fostered an "understanding'' of tenure rights during the years of the professor's employment, the Court found that the existence of rights under an
implied-in-fact tenure system (even in the face of formal disclaimer of a
tenure system) would be a sufficient property interest in continued employment to support a claim for due process protection. 137
The "liberty'' interest as defined in Roth, would be adversely affected, thus
triggering a right to procedural due process, if a termination were based on a
charge of "dishonesty'', immorality, or where
a person's good name, reputation, honor or integrity is at stake because of what
the government is doing to him, or where the state, in declining to re-employ him
. . . imposed on him a stigma or other disability that foreclosed his freedom to
take advantage of other employment opportunities. 138

The Supreme Court in Roth in applying that criteria found that the failure to
renew a nontenured professor's contract by itself did not adversely affect a
"liberty'' interest. The Court stated that "[i]t stretches the concept too far to
suggest that a person is deprived of 'liberty' when he simply is not rehired in
one job but remains free as before to seek another."139
The interpretive definitions of these constitutional terms although somewhat abstract become less so as they take on additional meaning when
applied to individual cases. A sampling of decisional holdings interpreting
"liberty'' and "property'' will illustrate.
"Property'' interests sufficient to invoke constitutional due process protection have been found in the following types of cases: by virtue of holding a
tenured position, 140 explicitly or impliedly, 141 or a term contract, 142 and due to
substantial longevity of service either alone or coupled with other factors
fostering legitimate expectations to re-employment. 143 On the other hand,
tas Id.
136
131

I d. at 578.

Percy v. Sinderman, supra note 20. .
Bd. of Regents v. Roth, supra note 21.
139 Id. at 575.
14(1 Wagner v. Elizabeth City Bd. ofEduc., 496 S.W. 2d 468 (Tex. 1973); Collins v. Wolfson,
498 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1974); Univ. of Alaska v. Chauvin, 521 P.2d 1234, 1238 (Alas. 1974).
141 Percy v. Sinderman, supra note 20, at 602.
142
Bd. of Regents v. Roth, supra note 21, at 576.
143 Johnson v. Fraley, 470 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1972); Blunt v. Marion Cnty. Sch. Bd., 515 F.2d
951 (5th Cir. 1975); Zintmerman v. Spencer, 485 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1973); Scheelhaase v.
Woodbury Central Community Sch. Dist., 488 F.2d 237 (8th Cir. 1973); Soni v. Bd. of Trustees
ofUniv._~(_Tenn., 513 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1975).
138
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Roth is usually interpreted to represent the general rule that nontenured
professors have no property interest in continued employment and thus no
right to a due process hearing. 144 The length of service of a nontenured
professor typically is found inconsequential; for example, no property interests· were found where nonrenewal occurred after one year service where
tenure was acquireable after four years, 145 or five years, 146 or after four years
of a five year probationary :period. 147 As has been stated, the relevant source
as to whether a property interests exists in the employment relationship is
most often found in pertinent state law relating to the reasonable expectancy
of entitlement to reemployent. 146 This principle is illustrated, albeit by somewhat strained analysis, inBishop v. Wood, 149 ·a 1976 case where the Supreme
Court found that a municipal ordinance classifying an employee as "permanent'' under pertinent state law was intended to mean "terminable at will"
and thus forced the conclusion that no property interest existed so as to
require a due process hearing. It is doubtful whether such a result is likely
under a tenure contract where by definition one is presumed continually
employed until cause is shown and proved by the employer. Of course the
pertinent state law creating the rights in the tenure contact must be closely
examined to ascertain whether the usual definition of tenure is intended or
whether it was meant to be more closely analogous to the "permanent'' status
of a civil servant under a North Carolina type of civil service system where it
was meant only as a descriptive rather than as a rights-granting status. In
sum, it is clear that untenured professors have little expectation of being constitutionally entitled to a due process hearing upon their nonrenewal on the
basis of possessing a "property'' interest.
illustrations of "liberty'' interests that courts have found sufficient to
invoke due process protection are as follows. A "stigma" or an adverse effect
on one's reputation or integrity was created which would foreclose future
employment opportunities where termination or nonrenewal was based on
failure to undergo psychiatric exam when so ordered, 150 a charge of mental
illness, 151 a "racist" charge, 152 removal was by unconventional means with
attendant damaging publicity, 153 injury to reputation occurred by an abrupt
144

Scheelhaase v. Woodbury Central Comm. Sch. Dist., I d. See also, Bd. of Regents v. Roth,
supra note 21, which held that a violation offrrst amendment rights does not give one a right to
a due process hearing.
145
Seitz v. Clark, 524 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1975).
146
Blair v. Bd. of Regents of State Univ. and Comm. College System, Tenn., 496 F.2d 322
(6th Cir. 1974); Buhr v. Buffalo Pub. Sch. Dist., 509 F.2d 1196 (8th Cir. 1974).
147
,
Sheppard v. W. Va. Bd. of Regents, 516 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1975).
148 Perry v. Sindermann, supra note 20, at 601.
149 43 U .S.L. W. 4820 (1975). In 1974 in Arnett v. Kennedy, a plurality of the Court found that
a hearing procedure provided by the government did not in and of itself create a property
interest. 416 U.S. 134, 163 (1974). However, a majority of the Justices found that the facts
showed the existence of a property interest.
150
Stewart v. Pearce, 484 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1973).
151
Lombard v. Bd. ofEduc. of City of New York, 502 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974).
152
Wellner v. Minnesota State Junior College Board, 487 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1973).
153
Zumwalt v. Trustees of Cal. State Colleges, supra note 7.; Merritt v. Consol. Sch. Dist.
No. 8, Rio Grande County, 522 P.2d 137 (Colo. 1974).
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termination of an employee of substantial longevity, 154 and by charges of
fraud155 and untruthfulness. 156 On the other hand judicial interpretations
have found that the "liberty'' interest is not adversely affected where one is
simply not rehired in one job and remains free to seek another, 157 or charged
with failure to be compatible with students, other employees, and members of
the community/58 as "anti-establishment,"159 ·or charges of minor inadequacies such as tardiness160 or even of inadequate performance. 161 In Bishop v.
Wood 162 the Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision held that where "the reasons
were never made public" there coUld be no basis for claiming an invasion of
the liberty interest protecting one's good name, reputation or integrity; this
was so even though the charges were in fact false. 163 Whether this holding
will be broadly read so as to severely limit prior cases interpreting "liberty''
interests but not concerning themselves with the public-privat aspects is not
entirely clear from the Court's opinion. In sum, the courts have in recent years
stepped in on an ad hoc basis in non-renewal cases to find a "liberty'' interest
in protecting one's good reputation where it has a high probability of being
damaged and then requiring a due process hearing in which the charges may
be defended.
To complete the analysis of the availability of constitutional procedural due
process to faculty at public institutions, it is necessary to ascertain when the
hearing is required (pre or post termination), whether reasons for the separation must be given, the nature of the hearing that is required, and finally the
remedy that is afforded for its violation.
b. Time of Hearing
The Supreme Court in Roth stated "[w]hen protected interests are implicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount164••• except for
extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake
that justifies postponing the hearing until after the event."165 Subsequent
154

Johnson v. Fraley, supra note 143.
Huntley v. The North Carolina State Bd. ofEduc., 493 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1974).
156 Hostrop v. Bd. of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 471 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1972).
157
Bd. of Regents v. Roth, supra note 21, at 575.
158
Whatley v. Price, 368 F. Supp. 336 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
159
Lipp v. Bd. ofEduc. of the City of Chicago, 470 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1972).
160
Brouillette v. Bd. of Directors of Merged Area IX. Alias Eastern Iowa Comm. College, 519
F.2d 126 (8th Cir. 1975); Gray v. Union County Intermediate Educ. Dist., 520 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. ·
1975).
161
Blair v. Bd. of Regents of State Univ. & College System of Tenn., supra note 146; Abeveta
v. The Town of Taos, 499 F.2d 323 (lOth Cir. 1974); Sherck v. Thomas, 486 F.2d 691 (7th Cir.
1973); Jablon v. Trustees of the Cal. State Colleges, 482 F.2d 997 (9th Cir. 1973); But see,
Whitney v. Bd. of Regents, 335 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
62
1
44 U.S.L.W. 4820 (1976).
163
I d. at 4822. There is a vigorous dissent.
164
Bd. of Regents v. Roth, supra note 21, at 569-570.
165 Id. 570 f.n. 7 citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,379 (1971) and see Bell v. Burson,
402 u.s. 535 (1971).
155
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decisions have amplified on this point holding that the hearing should occur
before the deprivation of the interest, not the decision to deprive. 166
Suspensions have been accorded somewhat similar treatment by the courts
in that absent a sufficient government interest, a pre-suspension hearing is
required. 167 For example the Supreme Court in Goss 168 recently held that
students facing disciplinary suspensions of less than 10 days were entitled to
rudimentary procedural due process before suspension. In other cases involving public employees the lower courts have split on the question. 169 In sum,
the courts have made clear that in all but exceptional cases when one is
entitled to_procedural due process, it should be accorded prior to deprivation
. . of the interest.
It should be evident that reasons for termination or nonrenewal need not be
provided when no protected "liberty'' or property interest is involved; 170 and
conversely, where they are involved, reasons must be given as part of the
required process that is due in providing a fair hearing. In Sindermann the
Supreme Court stated that the existence of a protected interest would
obligate college officials to grant a hearing at his request, where he·'could be
informed of the grounds for his nonretention and challenge their sufficiency.171
c. Nature of Required Hearing
The nature of the fair hearing that is required by due process continues to
be addressed by the courts. The Supreme Court has held that the form of the
hearing may vary to be "appropriate to the nature of the case", 172 that the
exact nature of the hearing can vary "depending upon the importance of
interests involved,"173 and that due process is a term that "negates any
concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable
situation."174 As stated earlier Sindermann requires reasons and a hearing in
which to challenge their sufficiency; beyond that the Court has indicated that
"the form of hearing required ... by procedural due process may be determined by assessing and balancing the ... particular interests ... " of the
professor and institution. 175 Although cases not arising in higher education
166

Chung v. Park, supra note 14; Vance v. Chester Cnty Bd. ofSch. Trustees, 504 F.2d 820
(4th Cir. 1974).
167
Examples of a sufficient government interest can be found in Pordum v. Bd. of Regents of
State of New York, 491 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1974) (conviction of felony); Moore v. Knowles, 482
F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1973) (indictment for sex crimes); but see, Peacock v. Bd. of Regents ofUniv.
and State Colleges of Arizona, 510 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1975).
168 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
169 Id.
170 See, e.g., Seitz v. Clark, supra note 145; Cusamano v. Ratchford, 507 F.2d 980 (8th Cir.
1975).
171 Perry v. Sinderman, supra note 20.
172
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
173 Boddie v. Connecticut, supra note 165, at 378.
174 Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
175 Bd. of Regents v. Roth, supra note 21, at 570. See also, Goss v. Lopez, supra note 162, and
Chung v. Park, supra note 14.
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may provide clues as to the minimum standards required in a due process
hearing in a university setting, 176 cases have arisen in education cases so as to
provide guidelines for the hearings. For example, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals177 has set forth the following requirements in a due process hearing:
(1) adequate notice, (2) specification of charges, (3) opportunity to confront
adverse witnesses, and (4) the opportunity to be heard in one's own defense.
Other cases have from time added such requirements as the right to examine
a hearing officer's report before the board acts on it, 178 the right to call
witnesses, 179 the right to have assistance of counsel, 180 and the right to an
impartial decisionmaker.181
The courts have liberally interpreted the meaning of impartial "decisionmaker." For example in 1976 the Supreme Court affirmed that principle by
ruling that a school board could properly conduct disciplinary hearings involving teachers who had engaged in an unlawful strike. 182
A showing that the Board was 'involved' in the events preceding this decision,
in light of the important interest in leaving with the Board the power given by the
state legislature, is not enough to overcome the presumption of integrity in
policymakers with decisionmaking power. 183

The Court stated that to overcome presumed impartiality it must be shown
that the decisionmakers " ... had the kind of personal or financial stake in
the decision that might create a conflict of interest ..."184 or evidence that he
is not capable ofjudging a particular controversy fairly on the basis onts own
circumstances. 185 Cases arising in the education area reflect the same liberal
approach in determining impartiality. 186
Should a university violate a professor's constitutional right to due process
certain remedies are available, the most common of which is to remand the
case to the school with an order to hold an appropriate hearing. Courts
usually will not permit substitution of court proceedings for an inhouse
institutional hearing in that it otherwise would undermine the constitutional
requirement of a hearing. 187
Reinstatement as a remedy has not been common and in Roth the Supreme
Court stated that, after conducting a hearing required because of the affected
See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
Vance v. Chester Cnty. Bd. of Sch. Trustees, 504 F.2d 820, 824 (5th Cir. 1974) citing
Grimes v. Nottoway Cnty Sch. Bd., 462 F.2d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 1972) and see Ferguson v.
Thomas, 430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1970).
178
Winston v. Bd. ofEduc. ofBorough of South Plainfield, 64 N.J. 582, 319 A.2d 226 (1974).
179
Nichols v. Eckert, 504 P.2d 1359 (Alas. 1973).
180
Ortwein v. Mackey, 358 F. Supp. 705, 714 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
181
But see, Simard v. Bd. ofEduc. of the Town of Groton, 473 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1973); Swab v.
Cedar Rapids Comm. Sch. Dist., 494 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1974).
182
Hortonville Jt. Sch. Dist. v. Hortonville Educ. Assoc., 44 U.S.L.W. 4864 (1976).
183 I d. at 4868.
184 I d. 4867.
185 ld. citing United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941).
186
See, e.g., Simard v. Bd. ofEduc., supra note 181; Shaw v. Bd. of Trustees, 396 F. Supp.
872, 888-98 (D. Md. 1975); Simon v. Poe, 391 F. Supp. 430 (W.D. N.C. 1975).
187
Skehan v. Bd. ofTrustees of Bloomsburg State College, 501 F.2d 31, 40 (3d Cir. 1974). But
see, Zimmerer v. Spencer, supra note 143.
176
177
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"liberty'' interest, his employer, of course, may remain free to deny him
future employment for other reasons, 188 and in Sindermann the Court held
"[p]roof of such a property interest would not, of course, entitle him to
reinstatement." 189 This has been interpreted to preclude reinstatement in
"liberty'' infringement cases, 190 though on occasion reinstatement has been
ordered by the courts. 191
Damages have also been awarded by some courts, generally to the extent of
salary lost due to the deprivation of procedural due process. 192

C. Non-Constitutional Right to Fair Hearing
Even absent constitutional requirements to provide procedural due process,
it is a fact that many public universities "gratuitously'' provide hearing
procedures for tenured and non-tenured faculty members. In this situation
several legal aspects arise. First, the general rule is that the school once
adopting the procedures must follow them regardless of whether they are
established by state statute193 or institutional regulation. 194 In those cases
where a constitutional interest is not sufficiently affected, courts have correctly held that the standard to be followed is that of the regulation and not
the constitution. 195 That standard has been held to be a reasonable and nonarbitrary proceeding which is "fair and adequate." 19 ~ The court in Arnett v.
Kennedy has further held that such procedures do not necessarily in and of
themselves create a "property'' interest for due process purposes. 197 Justice
Rehnquist in a plurality opinion found that a statute covering federal employ-ees permitting removal only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of
the service when concurrently granting specific procedural guidelines " ...
did not create an expectancy of job retention in those employees requiring
procedural protection ... beyond that afforded ... by the statute and related
agency regulations." 198
188

Bd. of Regents v. Roth, supra note 21, 573 n.12.
Perry v. Sinderman, supra note 20, at 603.
190 Wellner v. Minnesota State Junior College Bd., 487 F.2d 153, 157 (8th Cir. 1973).
191 Stewart v. Pearce,484 F.2d 1031, 1032 (9th Cir. 1973); Univ. of Alaska v. Chauvin, supra
note 140.
192
Soni v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Tenn., supra note 143; Wellner v. Minnesota State
Junior College Bd., supra note 190; Huntley v. North Carolina State Bd. ofEduc., supra note
155.
193
See, e.g., Brouillette v. Board of Directors of Merged Area IX, 519 F.2d 126 (8th Cir. 1975);
Pollock v. McKenzie County Public Sch. Dist. No.1, 221 N.W. 2d 521 (N.D. 1974).
194
See, e.g., Decker v. Worcester Junior College, 336 N.E. 2d 909 (Mass. 1975); Fredricks v.
Sch. Bd. of Monroe Cnty, 307 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 1975); ASSAF v. Univ. ofTex. System, 399 F.
Supp. 1245 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
195 Buhr v. Buffalo Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 38, 509 F.2d 1196, 1204 (8th Cir. 1974); Ring v.
Schlesinger, 502 F.2d 479, 487 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
196 Toney v. Reagan, 467 F.2d 953, 960 (9th Cir. 1972).
197
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
198
Id. at 163. However, the majority of the Justices concluded that the facts demonstrated
the existence of a property interest which must be protected by due process meeting constitutional standards.
189
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In summary, the case law discussed above shows that substantive constitutional rights are available to faculty members teaching at public universities.
And to an increasing extent this protects many of the same interests guarded
by the concept of academic freedom, thus diminishing the need for tenure to
protect those areas otherwise protected by constitutional guarantee. Procedural due process on the other hand while guaranteed to those with tenure is
not readily available to nontenured professors. Thus, without tenure or some
equivalent property interest in continuing employment, most professors
would be without the constitutional protection of entitlement to procedural
due process and would instead be left to the procedures provided by the
university (if any were provided) which procedures are not subject to the
stricter constitutional requirement of due process.
Having described the legal relationship between rights under the constitution and tenure systems, it is thereafter a policy judgment whether to force a
choice between the two. As discussed earlier, unlike court litigation of constitutional rights, tenure systems move the burden of proof from professor to
institution. It has been noted that
[U]nless 'possessed of extraordinary fortitude' many choose not to pursue a
legal claim after weighing the considerable problems of expense, delay and the
possible effect upon future teaching opportunities. 199

It should also be pointed out that as institutions and state legislatures
would seek to diminish the measure of job security afforded by tenure, there
would seem to be a predictable and logical movement by faculty members
toward seeking job security through alternative means including collective
bargaining. Typically, faculty unions will attempt to provide job protection
similar to that of tenure through contract clauses calling for dismissal only
for good cause and after appropriate procedures are followed. 200
III. ILLUSTRATION OF NON-STATUTORY TENURE: VIRGINIA'S SYSTEM

As can be seen from the prior analyses, many of the legal aspects of tenure
have not yet been widely litigated across the country; and therefore, not
unexpectedly, few tenure cases in higher education have been decided in
Virginia. However, a body of law has developed and when read within the
context of the earlier material provides an illustration of the likely legal
status of tenure in higher education as applied to one state, Virginia, and
permits a prediction of the likely outcome oflitigation on the issue of whether
tenure rights exist in Virginia and in other states absent their statutory
conception.
199 Matheson, J udicialEnforcement ofAcademic Tenure: An Examination, 50 WASH. L. REv.
597' 621 (1975).
200
See, e.g., W. McHugh, Faculty Unionism and Tenure, in CoMMISSION ON AcADEMIC
TENURE IN HIGHER EDUCATION 194 (1973); and W. McHugh, Effects Of Bargaining On Tenure
And Other Academic Policies, in FACULTY BARGAINING IN THE SEVENTIES (1973); and see
generally, E. DURYEA, R. FisK, AND Assoc., FACULTY UNIONS AND CoLLECTIVE BARGAINING
(1973).
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A. Present Tenure Systems In Virginia
1 . Constitutional and Statutory Bases
The Constitution of Virginia art. VIII, §9 provides for statutorily created
and controlled institutions of higher education with governance by their
individual boards of visitors. It states:
The General Assembly may provide for the establishment, maintenance, and
operation of any educational institutions which are desirable for the intellectual,
cultural, and occupational development of the people of this Commonwealth. The
governance of such institutions, and the status and powers of their boards of
visitors or other governing bodies, shall be as provided for law.

Therefore the creation and regulation of faculty personnel policies are found
in the statutes relating to a particular university including its regulations
and by laws. A typical statute in Virginia gives broad, general authority to
the board of visitors and is illustrated by the College of William and Mary
where the Board is empowered to
. . . control and expend the funds of the colleges and any appropriation hereafter
provided, and shall make all needful rules and regulations concerning the colleges, and generally direct the affairs of the colleges . . .201

Additionally, §23-16 explicitly gives the institutions the right to sue and be
sued on its contractual obligations and do all things necessary to carry out its
powers. It would appear then that the public colleges and universities in
Virginia have not created a statutory tenure system, but rather have left to
each institution the authority to create regulations relating to personnel
policies and enter into employment contracts with faculty members. The
creation and validity of those contracts for tenure are discussed subsequently.
The community college system in Virginia is likewise created and controlled by statute but with central authority vested in the State Board for
Community Colleges whose authority is " ... the establishment, control, and
administration of a state-wide system of publicly supported comprehensive
community colleges."202 A chief executive officer, the chancellor, is appointed
to administer the system203 and, subject to Board approval, shall fix salaries
of employees, 204 and " ... enforce the standards established by the Board for
personnel employed in the administration of this chapter and remove or
cause to be removed each employee who does not meet such standards."205
The Board in establishing procedures has replaced a tenure system with a
system of term contracts wherein multi-year appointments based on one,
three, and five-year terms are granted while a defined concept of academic
freedom is specifically reserves!~ the faculties. 206 Personnel dissatisfied with
201

VA. CoDE ANN. §23-44 (Repl. Vol. 1973). A few institutions do have somewhat more
specific authority, with several universities expressly mentioning the reservation of the right
to appoint and remove professors. E.g., University of Virginia, VA. CoDE §23-76 (Repl. Vol.
1973).
202
VA. CoDE ANN. §23-215 (Repl. Vol.1973).
20a Id., §§23-223,-224 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
204
I d., §23-225 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
2 os Id., §23-231 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
206
See, Professional Employee's Appointment Policy §1 (adopted 1972 as revised).
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·evaluations or non-renewals are entitled to written reasons and access to
review procedures. 207 The American Association of University Professors in
evaluating the policies has found them deficient and argues that they are
below professional norms and therefore has voted academic sanctions against
the Virginia Community College System. 208

2. Role of State Council of Higher Education

In addition to the above-described college and university systems, Virginia
by statute has created a State Council of Higher Education " . . . to promote
the development.and operation of a sound vigorous, progressive, and coordinated system of higher education in the State of Virginia."209 Though its
authority extends over state-supported institutions of higher education, 210
statutes provide that the Council may provide advisory services to private
non-profit colleges within the Commonwealth on academic and administrative matters, 211 and the State Board for Community Colleges is required to
"adhere to the policies of the State Council of Higher Education for the
coordination of higher education as required by law."212
The duties of the Council are primarily advising and assisting the universities in evaluating future needs in mission, programs, and facilities
and providing information to the Governor and General Assembly for purposes of proposing possible legislation. 213 However, the Council does possess
authority to approve or disapprove future proposed changes in missions of
institutions of higher education, new academic programs, and
" ... require discontinuance of any academic program which is presently offered
by any public institution of higher education when the Council determines that
such academic program is nonproductive in terms of the number of degrees
granted and ... budgetary considerations."214

Lastly it is empowered to "conduct such other studies in the field of higher
education as the Council deems appropriate or as may be requested by the
Governor or General Assembly." 215
The statute creating the powers of the Council also seeks to limit its
ultimate authority over the individual institutions. For example though the
Council may disapprove missions or programs of institutions, it is not empowered "to affect, either directly or indirectly, the selection of faculty ... it
being the intention of this section that faculty selection policies shall remain
a function of the individual institutions."216 In specific language the Council
in carrying out its duties is directed to "preserve the individuality, traditions,
ld.
See, Academic Freedom and Tenure: The Virginia Community College System: A Report
on Tenure and Due Process, 61 AAUP BULL. 30-39 (1975).
209
VA. ConE ANN. §23-9.3 (Supp. 1975).
2
1° Id., §23-9.5 (Supp. 1975).
211
Id., §23-9.10:2 (Supp. 1975).
212
Id .• §23-221 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
213
Id., §23-9.6:1 (Supp. 1975).
207

208

I d.
Id., §23-9.6:1(k) (Supp. 1975).
216
Id., §23-9.1:1(b) (Supp. 1975).
214
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and sense ofresponsibilty of the respective institutions."217 Additionally, the
powers of the institution are reserved as follows:
The powers of the governing boards of the several institutions over the affairs of
such institutions shall not be impaired by the provisions of this chapter except to
the extent that powers and duties are herein specifically conferred upon the State
Council of Higher Education. 218

With regard to faculty tenure, it appears that though the Council can
collect data and make recommendations on faculty personnel policies such as
tenure, but the ability to make employment contracts that might contain
tenure proVisions remains with the individual institutions. However, actions
by the Council could generate questions about the legal status of tenure in
Virginia. For example the Council by altering a university's nonproductive
degree program or disapproving a new academic program could affect the
number of faculty needed at a particular institution and thus a question could
arise at the institutional level as to the legal rights of a "tenured" faculty
member (with rights to continuing employment) whose job was adversely
affected. 219

3. Virginia's Public Policy on Tenure
The last matter needing to be mentioned before analyzing the legality of
tenure in Virginia is the apparent public policy of the Commonwealth on the
question of tenure. Though the House Committee on Education of the Virginia Assembly in 1973 had before it a bill requiring the State Board for
Community Colleges to rescind its policies on appointments and to establish a
statutory system of tenure, the bill was never acted upon by the Assembly
and the proper interpretation of that non-action is at best ambiguous. 220
Two existing statutes perhaps give a clearer picture as to state policy, the
Virginia Personnel Act221 and the statute relating to teacher tenure rights. 222
The Assembly has recently created a statutory system of tenure for public
school teachers which establishes a continuing contract scheme under which
a teacher serves a probationary period of three years and then if found to have
performed satisfactorily is placed on a continuing contract status during
"good behavior and competent service."223 In the event of a dismissal or
suspension decision, the ·right to reasons and a hearing are provided to
Id., §23-9.6:1(h) (Supp. 1975).
Id. §23-9.14 (Supp. 1975).
219
Almost every university with a tenure policy permits discharge for financial exigency.
See, e.g., AAUP v. Bloomfield College, supra note 7; Levitt v. Bd. of Trustees ofNebraska state
Colleges, 376 F. Supp. 945 (D. Neb. 1974); Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wise.
System, 377 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Wis. 1974); Univ. of Alaska v. Chauvin, supra note 140. For
further discussion of this point see text accompanying Footnotes 39-52 in Section I, supra.
220
H.B. 1296 (1973 Sess.).
221 VA. CoDE ANN. §2.1-110 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
222 Id., §§22-217.1 to 217.8 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
223
Id., §22-217.4 (Repl. Vol. 1973). The statute further defines grounds for dislnissal or
probation as "incompetency, immorality, noncompliance with school laws and regulations,
disability as shown by competent medical evidence, or for other good and just cause." VA. CoDE
§22-217.5 (Repl. Vol. 1973) applied in Johnson v. Fraley, 470 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1972).
217
218
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probationary and nonprobationary teachers. 224 The statute also explicitly
reserves the right to reduce the number of teachers because of a decrease in
enrollment or abolition of particular subjects notwithstanding the fact that a
teacher has a continuing contract status. 225 Lastly, the statute points out that
nothing in the continuing contract right shall be construed to authorize the
school board to contract for any financial obligation beyond the period for
which funds have been made available with which to meet such obligation. 226
The Virginia Personnel Act applicable to most state employees was established
... to ensure for the Commonwealth a system of personnel administration based
on merit principles and objective methods of appointment, promotion, transfer,
layoff, removal, discipline, and other incidents of State employment. 227 •

The appointing State agencies are authorized to establish and maintain
methods of administration relating to the "establishment and maintenance of
personnel standards on a merit basis and"226 "an appeal procedure which shall
assure all persons employed under this chapter a full and impartial inquiry
into the circumstances of removal. 229 Thus it appears that a state employee
has the right to continue employm~nt absent a showing of a "meritorious
cause, the merits of which may be considered at a hearing. "230 While it is true
as a general proposition that public employees are usually terminable at will,
i.e., they have no right to continuing employment flowing from public employment itself, when a statute modifies that typical position and states that
discharge must be for just cause, a question can arise whether it is a breach of
contract flowing from the statutory duty to dismiss the employee absent that
cause. The statute specifically exempts from coverage professors in state
educational institutions, presumably because other personnel policies, including tenure policies, are applicable. 231
In sum, the predominate public policy in Virginia appears to be that many
state employees and most public school teachers should be provided some
measure of job security in the form of tenured employment. Though under
any tenure system a non-performing employee may be dismissed, the thrust
of tenure statutes is to guarantee that legitimate grounds for dismissal do
exist and that certain procedures are followed usually prior to dismissal.
B. Contracts For Tenure: Formation and Validity
Since there is no statutory system of tenure in higher education in Virginia, the formation and validity of contracts for tenure will depend on
ordinary contract law. As discussed earlier, an educational institution could
Id., §§22-217.6, 217.7, 217.8:1 (Supp. 1975).
Id., §22-217.4 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
226 Id.
227 Id., §2.1-110 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
228 Id., §2.1-115 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
229 Id., §2.1-114(6) (Supp. 1975).
230 Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Bishop v. Wood, 44 U.S.L.W. 4820
(1976); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, supra note 21.
231 VA. ConE ANN. §2.1-116(8) (Repl. Vol. 1973).
224
225
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create a contract for tenure by entering into an agreement with an express
provision for tenure or by incorporating by reference into the employment
agreement, either directly or impliedly, certain college regulations creating
tenure. Whether these agreements in Virginia would be found legally formed
and validly enforceable is discussed below.
It can be assumed that a public university with the authority as is given in
Virginia code §23-16 to enter into contracts may impliedly enter into an
employment agreement with its faculty with a provision for tenure in the
agreement. The Virginia Supreme Court in Batcheller v. Commonwealth232
held that the University of Virginia
has not only the powers expressly conferred upon it, but it also has the implied
power to do whatever is reasonably necessary to effectuate the powers expressly
granted. 233

Once authorized, the remaining questions of formation and validity of continuing contracts must be addressed. Especially intriguing is the question of
whether a typical faculty employment contract will incorporate by reference
the university tenure status.
The Supreme Court in Sindermann in discussing whether a professor had
tenure for due process purposes recognized that tenure may be implied and
that "[e]xplicit contractual provisions may be supplemented by other agreements implied from the 'the promisor's words and conduct in the light of the
surrounding circumstances.' ... and usage of the past."234 The Court also
held that, "[a]bsence of ... an explicit contractual [tenure] provision may not
always foreclose the possibility that a teacher has a 'property' interest in
reemployment," so that this is matter left to state law. 235
In Virginia there are few cases dealing with professor's tenure rights,
therefore analogous case law will often be examined. In Johnson v. Fraley 236
the court found that continuous employment over a significant period of time
can amount to' the "equivalent of tenure" and provide a property interest for
due process purposes. In dictum the court arguably recognized, though implicitly, the possibility that the teacher "had an implied contract amounting
under Virginia law, to de facto tenure."237 In Holliman v. Martin 238 the court,
in deciding another due process case, gave implicit recognition to tenure
232

176 Va. 109, 10 S.E.2d 529 (1940).

233

I d. at 535. However, a recent Virginia Supreme Court case on an analogous point held

that a county or school board has no implied authority to enter into enforceable collective
bargaining agreements with public employees absent explicit authorization because of an
expressed legislative policy against it. Commonwealth of Virginia v. The Cty. Bd. of Arlington, 217 Va 558, 232 S.E. 2d 30 (1977); but see, Kendall Bank Note Co. v. Comm. of Sinking
Fund, 79 Va. 563 (1884); 17 Michie's Jur. Virginia and W. Virginia §11 p. 212 (1951); and see
Hillis v. Meister, supra note 24.Butsee, Worzella v. Bd. ofRegents, 77 S.D. 447,93 N.W.2d4U-(1958).
234
Perry v. Sinderman, supra note 20.
235
Id. at 601.
236 470 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1972).
237
Id. at 184 n.l.
238 330 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Va. 1971).
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where, in dictum, the court found a probationary professor could be dismissed
more easily than one with tenure:
It is most important that this standard is considerably less severe than the
standard of'cause' used in the dismissal of tenured faculty. 239

And lastly, a Fourth Circuit case arising in Maryland found a teacher could
prove an express or implied contractual right to academic tenure. 240
The issue of incorporation by reference can arise first by an express
reference in the contract that tenure rights are conferred as defined in
writings outside the contract. The Virginia Supreme Court in W .D. Nelson &
Co. v. Taylor Heights Development Corp., 241 involving an interpretation of a
lease agreement, found that writings referred to in a contract but existing
outside it, "are construed as part of the contract."242 A faculty member's
contract not containing an express reference to tenure rights raises the issue
whether an institution's tenure policies in the regulations become part of the
employment agreement. In 1975 the Virginia Supreme Court in upholding
the dismissal of a teacher held
The law in existence when plaintiff entered into the contract of employment
became a part of the contract, and therefore the statutory provisions providing
that the Board could dismiss plaintiff at any time for certain causes was a part of
her contract. 243

An earlier case made clear that regulations are likewise incorporated into
agreements:
In Virginia, ... and generally in other jurisdictions throughout the country, it is
settled that relevant statutes and regulations existing at the time a contract is
made become part of it and must be read into it just as if they were expressly
referred to or incorporated in its terms. 244

Although the extent to which university regulations can be analogized to
other types of government regulations is at times nebulous, precedent outside
Virginia holds that such regulations are impliedly incorporated into the
employment agreement and must be followed. 245 Thus in view of the developing body oflaw outside Virginia and within, it would appear probable that a
professor teaching at a Virginia university could properly claim a right to
tenure that has been granted to him by university policy.
The issue of the legal validity of tenure contracts has arisen in Virginia
under the somewhat analogous description of "permanent employment'' contracts. The Supreme Court of Virginia has held that
Id. at 11.
Parker v. Bd. ofEduc. ofPrince George's County, Md., 348 F.2d 464, 465 (4th Cir. 1965).
241
207 Va. 326, 150 S.E. 2d 142 (1966).
242
Id. at 146.
243
Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Spotsylvania v. McConnell, 215 Va. 603, 212 S.E. 2d 264 (1975).
244
General Electric Co. v. Mo~etz, 2'70 F.2d 780, (4th Cir. 1959).
245
See, e.g., Greene, supra note 25; and Hillis v. Meister, supra note 24.
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It is a settled doctrine in this State that where no specific time is fixed for the
duration of an employment, there is a rebuttable presumption that it is an
employment at will, terminable at any time by either party. 246

However the Court held that where an employee can be terminated only for
just cause it is no longer terminable at will and is enforceable. 247 The Court
held
... a definite time was fixed for the duration of the employment. It was by the
terms of the contract, to continue until the plaintiff gave to the defendant just
cause to end it..... It was a promise in return for services which the plaintiff
performed and which furnished sufficient consideration for a binding contract. In
such a case the doctrine of mutuality is inapplicable. 248

The analogy to the university setting seems clear, a contract for continuing
employment and of indefinite duration has Virginia precedent to find it
validly enforceable.
.
The question arose in the earlier analysis regarding the efficacy of a clause
placed in the university regulations disclaiming any legal effectiveness of the
tenure rights provided; as there appears to be an absence of Virginia law on
this point, one can assume that it will meet with the same close judicial
scrutiny if not hostility as discussed before. 249
Additional issues relating to the enforceability of tenure contracts can.
include whether a one-year contract, the normal length of contracts in fouryear colleges in Virginia, given to a tenured professor causes a waiver of
rights to continuing employment (i.e., tenure). Law outside Virginia has
concluded negatively and Virginia case law by analogy would seem to predict
the same result in that knowledge and intent to waive are normally prerequisites. 250 In point of fact, the justification for one-year contracts flows from the
Virginia Constitution Article X §7 which in pertinent part reads
No money shall be paid out of the State treasury except in pursuance of appropriations made "by law; and no such appropriation shall be made which is payable
more than two years and six months after the end of the session of the General
Assembly at which the law is enacted authorizing the same.

Interestingly, faculty contracts at community colleges may be up to five year
appointments yet there is no qualifying language in the contract to indicate
the constitutional limitation. One can only presume there is no problem
agreeing to employment contracts for a duration exceeding two and one-half
years as long as it is understood to be subject to appropriate funding. Of
Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. Harris, 190 Va. 966, 59 S.E. 2d 110, 114 (1950);see also Wards
Co. v. Lewis & Dobrow Inc., 210 Va. 751, 173 S.E. 2d 861 (1970).
247
Id. at 114.
248 Id. See also, F. S. Royster Guano v. Hall, 68 F.2d 533 (4th Cir. 1934) where the Fourth
Circuit enforced a lifetime contract made in settlement of a personal injury claim and found it
not to fail for indefiniteness.
249
See text accompanying footnotes 144-147 in Section II.
250
See, e.g., Woodmen of World Life Ins. Soc. v. Grant, 185 Va. 288, 38 S.E. 2d 450 (1946)
where it is pointed out that the holder of contractual rights may waive them expressly or
impliedly or by conduct, act, or course of dealing, but he must have knowledge of his rights and
intend to waive them.
246
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course the agreement would incorporate by reference the above constitutional provision.
A final legal issue relating to tenure contracts, assuming they have been
validly created and are enforceable, is whether tenure once granted is a
vested contract right or whether it can be unilaterally taken from the tenured
professor. There is a clear absence of case law on this point nationally, though
a recent decision is somewhat ·related. In Rehor, 251 the court held that a
professor who had certain vested retirement rights including retirement age
had agreed to permit reasonable alterations of them and at any rate by a new
agreement, supported by additional consideration, could and did modify those
rights. The court found consideration was present in that the professor
accepted a change in those benefits and received an increased salary during
his remaining years at the institution and additionally such changes were
permitted by the agreement itself.
The Virginia Constitution, articles I & IT appears to speak to this issue,
assuming there is a valid contract, when it forbids the General Assembly to
"pass any law impairing the obligations of contract."252 Case law interpreting
this section has held that it is settled law in Virginia that a statute in force at
the date of contract is an element of it as to its construction and binding force
or obligation, as much as if the written contract so declared. 253 Also it has
been held that a right is deemed vested when it is so fixed that it is not
dependent on any future act, contingency or decision to make it so secure. 254
The remaining question is whether such university regulations creating
rights to tenure are within the meaning of "vested" and "statute" under the
Constitution. Absent legislation, only litigation can resolve that issue.
A professor's employment contract with tenure is of course a personal
services contract; and therefore, should a breach of it occur, damages are the
usual remedy in Virginia. 255 As in other contract cases exceptions are made
where it can be shown that damages are inadequate in which case specific
performance will be decreed. Although instances of the exception exist in
Virginia, for example where damages were inadequate, 256 and the value of
the services were not capable of pecuniary estiillation, 257 few courts in or
outside of Virginia have permitted reinstatment in. personal services contracts on the ground that equity will not compel the continuation of an
Rehor v. Case Western Reserve University, supra note 25; also see text accompanying
footnote in Section I supra.
252 VA. CoDE ANN. §1-6 (Repl. Vol. 1973) also states that the repeal of any statute validating
previous contracts or transactions shall not affect their validity. The legislature may, however,
change rules of procedure except as restrained by the Constitution. Pine v. Commonwealth, 121
Va. 812, 93 S.E. 652 (1917).
253 Hawes v. William R. Trigg Co., 110 Va. 165, 65 S.E. 538 (1909).
254 Kennedy Coal Corp. v. Buckhorn Coal Corp., 140 Va. 37, 124 S.E. 482 (1924).
255 See, e.g., Fanney v. Virginia Investment and Mortgage Corp., 200 Va. 642, 107 S.E. 2d
414 (1959); Thompson v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 208, 89 S.E. 2d 64 (1955); and 17 Michie's Jur.
Virginia and West Virginia §66 p. 101 (1951).
256 Grubb v. Starkey, 90 Va. 83i, 20 S.E. 784 (1894).
257 Adams v. Snodgrass, 175 Va. 1, 7 S.E. 2d 147 (1940).
251
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incompatible personal relationship. 258 In Greene v. Howard 259 the court refused to reinstate professors for the following reasons:
It would. be intolerable for the courts to interject themselves and to require an
educational institution to adhere or to maintain on its staff a professor or instructor whom it deemed undesirable and did not wish to employ. For the courts to
impose such a requirement would be an interference with the operation of
institutions of higher learning contrary to established principles oflaw and to the
best tradition of education. 260

However, recent case law, though infrequent, has indicated a flexible
application of this rule. For example in Bloomfield College 261 the New Jersey
court ordered reinstatement where termination was based on unsubstantiated grounds of financial exigency rather than on dissatisfaction with
services. The court analogized this to the "route by which specific performance is obtained against a state body on the basis of contracts arising from
statute,"262 the substance of which is "nothing more than to compel adherence
to academic tenure commitments on the part of an educational institution."263
At least one non-contractual case has arisen in Virginia courts relative to
remedies in higher education where reinstatement was found permissible for
violation of constitutional rights. In Holliman v. Martin 264 a professor at
Radford College sought reinstatement on the grounds she was unconstitutionally terminated due to arbitrary and unfounded reasons or exercise of a
constitutionally protected right. The court denied the professor's claim but
held that a nontenured professor's dismissal must be based on the exercise of
judgment, not capriciousness of rightful exercise of constitutional rights, and
held that although bases given for nonretention will require very minimal
factual support, "if the College when brought into Court refuses to give any
reason for its action and relies solely on its discretionary authority, the
professor would be entitled to summary reinstatement."265
In sum, although there are winds of change, the likely remedy in Virginia
for breach of a professor's contract for tenure would be damages. 266
C. Tenure And Constitutional Rights In Virginia
Since the U.S. Constitution has national application, earlier analyses of
constitutional cases are sufficient, but some brief mention of cases arising in
Virginia will be given. Cases arising in Virginia adhere to the principle that
substantive constitutional rights apply to nontenured as well as tenured
professors. 267 The concept of academic freedom which some case law suggests
11 J. WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTs §1450 (3d ed. 1968); 5 A CoRBrn, CoNTRAcTs, §1204 (1964).
Supra note 25.
260
I d. at 615.
261
129 N.J. Super 249, 322 A.2d 846, 859 (1974); affd 346, A.2d 615 (App. div. 1975).
262 I d.
263
I d. The court turned down the argument of probationary period was sufficient.Id. at 860.
264
330 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Va. 1971); Phillips v. Puryear, 403 F. Supp. 80, 88 (W.D. Va. 1975).
265
Id. at 12.
266
For a recent similar holding see Bruno v. Detroit Institute of Technology, supra note 25.
267
E.G., Phillips v. Puryear, supra note 264; Holliman v. Martin, 330 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Va.
258
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would largely be subsumed under constitutional rights is arguably more
closely regulated in Virginia than in many other institutions of higher
education outside Virginia. Though there is no clear case law in Virginia
discussing the relationship of academic freedom to the first amendment, it
must be noted that statutory regulations appear that would place restraints
on what some might consider falling within or near a fme-line definition of
academic freedom. For example at Virginia Polytechnic fustitution the board
is authorized to prescribe not only the duties of the professors and courses of
instruction but also the "mode" of instruction. 268 Of course it is not clear that
such a prescription in any way would intrude into an area of academic
freedom, but it would seem to indicate the absence of reluctance by the
legislature to legislate into an area traditionally reserved to institutions and
their faculty and touching on matters embodied in their non-legal right of
academic freedom which is normally protected by tenure procedures. So
again, the conclusion on the relationship between tenure and substantive
constitutional rights is that new case law is emerging which may well protect
the same non-job security interests as are protected by academic freedom, but
that at this point in time it is not clearly accomplished by the courts.
The final area of analysis deals with a faculty member's right to a due
process hearing. As discussed in Roth and Sindermann, absent a liberty or
property interest, a professor has no constitutional right to a hearing on his
nonrenewal. Cases arising in Virginia confirm these principles which adhere
to the distinction between tenured and nontenured professors, finding the former but usually not the latter entitled to a hearing. 269 Examples of decisions
finding "property'' interests have been dismissal during the term of a contract270 and substantial longevity in employment creating a legitimate expectation to continued employment. 271 An illustration of the court finding a
"liberty'' interest where one's reputation was adversely affected occurred
when an institution suspended a professor on the basis he posed "a substantial threat to the welfare of the institution."272
An additional constitutional limitation on nonrenewal of faculty occurred
in Holliman v. Martin 273 where the court found that although a nontenured
professor at a public institution may have no rights to procedural due process,
an institution must not act arbitrarily or capriciously in its decision not to
retain the probationary professor. Though the professor was not entitled to a
due process hearing he was entitled in the court proceeding to have some reasons for his dismissal presented. 274 The burden of proof there as in other
claims of unconstitutional acts by the institution remains with the professor.27s
208

VA. CoDE ANN. §23-125 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
See generally, Holliman v. Martin, supra note 267; Phillips v. Puryear, supra note 264;
and see Kota v. Little, 473 F.2d (4th Cir. 1973).
270
Phillips v. Puryerr, supra note 264.
271
Johnson v. Fraley, 470 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1972).
272
Phillips v. Puryear, supra note 264, at 85; see also Huntley v. North Carolina State Bd. of
Educ., supra note 155.
273
Supra note 267.
274
I d. at 11.
275 ld.
269
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The nature of the constitutionally mandated due process hearing is, as
discussed earlier, flexible but requiring the elements of a fair hearing. In
addition to the Supreme Court decisions mentioned earlier, the Fourth Circuit has set forth certain guidelines in such hearings as including "adequate
notice," "specification of charges," "opportunity to confront adverse witnesses, and the opportunity to be heard in one's own defense." 276 The hearing
includes an unbiased decision-maker and evidence of bias would make the
hearing inadequate. 277
In sum, the legal aspects of tenure are increasing as litigation uncovers and
sometimes appears to create new and far-reaching legal implications. A full
understanding of these possible legal ramifications should be of aid to those
considering the viability and desirability of tenure, as well as provide guidance to the extent one has judicially enforceable tenure rights or obligations
absent a statutory system of tenure.
276
Vance v. Chester Cnty. Bd. of Sch. Trustees, 504 F.2d 820, 824 (4th cir. 1974) citing
Grimes v. Nottoway Cnty. Sch. Bd., 4.62 F.2d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 1972).
277 See, Phillips v. Puryear, supra note 264. See also Hortonville Jr. Sch. Dist. v. Hortonville
Educ. Assoc., 44 U.S.L.W. 4868 (1976).

